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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate policy. The first chapter analyzes
whether being labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm affects the firm’s dividend
policy. I focus on the dividend policy because of its discretionary nature and the link
to investor demand. To address endogeneity concerns, I use regression discontinuity
design around the threshold to assign firms to each category. The results show that
“value” firms have a significantly higher dividend payout - about four percentage
points - than growth firms. This approach establishes a causal link between firm
“growth/value” labels and dividend policy.
The second chapter develops investment policy model which associated with du-
ration of cash flow. Firms are doing their business by operating a portfolio of projects
that have various duration, and the duration of the project portfolio generates dif-
ferent duration of cash flow stream. By assuming the duration of cash flow as a firm
specific characteristic, this paper analyzes how the duration of cash flow affects firms’
investment decision. I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to
characterize how firms’ decision is affected by the duration of cash flow. Firms max-
imize total value of cash flow, while they have to maintain their solvency by paying
a fixed cost for the operation. I empirically confirm the positive correlation between
duration of cash flow and investment with theoretical support. Financial constraint
suffocates the firm when they face solvency issue, so that model with financial con-
straint shows that the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment is
stronger than low financial constraint case.
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Chapter 1
LABELING EFFECT ON PAYOUT POLICY
1.1 Introduction
Publicly traded firms are often categorized on the basis of identifiable characteris-
tics, such as their size, industry, and past performance. Investors must choose among
thousands of financial assets when allocating capital; financial institutions can ease
this choice by using labeling to convey information to investor and reduce the com-
plexity of asset allocation decisions. With this information in hand, investors can
trade entire asset categories without scrutinizing individual assets. Index labels can
affect investor sentiment and expectations for the asset category, an effect that would
be absent if individual investors already have detailed information for each firm.
In this paper, I examine whether corporate policies, especially payout policy is
affected by whether a firm is labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm. How firms
are categorized can change investors’ expectations for firms’ growth opportunities
and their future value. Firms have several choices about how to use their earnings.
For example, a firm may reinvest earnings in production through capital investment
or research & development if such opportunities exist. If not, the firm may choose
to retain its earnings or distribute the earnings to its shareholders. Growth firms
are typically expected to invest more in growth opportunities, while value firms are
expected to pay out more from their earnings. If a firm is labeled “value,” investors
do not expect much growth in the stock price, but they expect more stable value
than they do from a “growth” firm; investors might even leave value firms that do
not provide enough dividends.
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I investigate dividend policy in particular because it is one of the most direct
channels through which a firm can respond to investor sentiment. Investors maximize
their expected present value by allocating their assets. The expected value of holding
stock is based on the combination of dividend payouts and the future value of the
stock. Growth firms are expected to reinvest their earnings rather than distribute
them to shareholders. Investors do not demand high dividend payouts from growth
firms. Investors can hold stock even without a dividend payout if they expect the
value of the stock itself to compensate for lower dividends. However, if investors do
not observe much growth possibility from a firm, they will demand a high dividend
payout to compensate for the low expected rate of value growth from holding the
stock. These “value” firms have an incentive to pay a higher dividend to investors.
Therefore, a firm’s dividend policy depends not only on the firm’s characteristics, but
also on investors’ demand. This makes the labeling effect on dividend policy feasible
because index labeling delivers information, which affects investor demand through
the change in expected value for the firms.
While the previous literature has focused on the index labeling effect from the
investors’ side, this study contributes by investigating the labeling effect on corporate
policy from the firms’ side. The idea that investors’ behavior is influenced by index
membership is well established. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) use the terminology
“style investing,” which means that investors allocate funds across labels rather than
in individual securities. Boyer (2011) also analyzes whether investors actually use
index labels to determine how to allocate capital.
Baker and Wurgler (2004) propose a new dividend theory, which considers in-
vestors’ demand for dividend payout stocks. Their so-called catering theory hypoth-
esizes that investors categorize stocks as dividend payers and non-payers; categories
that are assumed to represent growth and value firms, and they give more value on
2
payers than on non-payers. By introducing a “dividend premium,” which measures
a valuation difference between dividend payers and non-payers, they report that the
dividend premium is related to aggregate dividend initiations. However, there is
no plausible explanation why investor evaluate differently. Moreover, according to
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), the dividend premium has little power to explain div-
idend trends. In this paper, I investigate whether economically meaningless labeling
induce payout policy through sentiment of investors who allocate capital across styles
described by labels. This provide empirical evidence for catering theory in the context
of growth versus value index labeling.
The data set I utilize includes firms in the S&P 500, which is a U.S. stock market
index based on the market capitalization of 500 large companies in leading industries.
Barra divided these S&P 500 companies into two groups - “Growth” and “Value” -
based on their book-to-market ratios. These S&P/Barra Growth and Value index
groups are rebalanced every June and December to equate the market cap of both
groups. Although Barra first created the index in May 1992, the index data were
backdated to May 1981, as if the index had existed during this period. I utilize data
from 1981 to 2003, so the 1981-1992 subsample can be used as a “control sample”
that is not expected to have any labeling effect, while the 1992-2003 “test sample” is
expected to have some labeling effect.
It is difficult to estimate the effect of labeling on corporate policy with standard
regressions. The potential problem is that unobservable systematic factors related to
each group might affect the corporate policy. Growth/value labeling only depends
on book-to-market ratio; however, there are firm characteristics other than book-
to-market ratio that clearly differ between the two groups. For example, changes in
corporate policy might be different across the two groups due to systematic disparities,
rather than to labeling itself.
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I use regression discontinuity design on the dividend policy to overcome the limi-
tation of standard regressions. This empirical strategy compares the dividend policy
changes among firms that are labeled “value” by a small margin and labeled “growth”
by a small margin. S&P/Barra must reset the boundary to rebalance the market cap
of each index group. As a result, a stock’s label can be switched to “value” after
its book-to-market ratios decrease, and vice versa. For firms that are close to the
cut-off value of the index, labeling is considered an exogenous and random event and
therefore uncorrelated with firm characteristics. Since indexation is exogenous from
the point of view of managers, the event should not have any effect on corporate
policy if the corporate policy is based on firms’ fundamentals. However, the labeling
leads to a discrete change in the dividend policy. I examine the labeling effects of
dividend payout empirically for both the control and the test samples. For S&P 500
firms during the test sample years, a positive increase in the dividend payout ratio
is observed when firms are assigned to the “value” index; during the control sample
years, there is no observable increase. The positive effect on dividend supports the
idea that the label has an effect on dividend payout policy even without any changes
in fundamental corporate conditions.
If the label affects individual investors’ sentiment, then it is also expected to have
an effect on institutional holdings. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Grullon and
Michaely (2002) show that institutional holdings do not affect firm policy, but earn-
ings distribution policy can attract institutional investors. Conversely, using Russell
1000 and Russell 2000 data, Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) find that institu-
tional holdings increase firms’ dividend payouts. Even though there is no empirical
evidence of discontinuity among institutional holdings with S&P 500 data, I control
for institutional holdings in the analysis of dividend payout policy as a robustness
test.
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In addition to dividend policy, I also consider share repurchases. Dividend policy
has become more conservative, and firms use repurchases as well as dividends to return
earnings to their investors (Skinner, 2008). I therefore examine whether repurchases
are also affected by index labeling. I also investigate other corporate policies, such
as leverage, investment, R&D, saving, and employment, and no other variables show
significant discontinuity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the data and the
index, while section 3 discusses empirical methods. Section 4 presents the empirical
evidence. Section 5 concludes this paper.
1.2 Data
I use index generated by Barra on book-to-market (BM ) ratio of firms from 1981
though 2003. Even though Barra stopped providing S&P/Barra Value and Growth
index data from their official website, the index data is available from May 1981
through March 2003 from Boyer’s website. 1 While Barra first created the index in
May 1992, the index data were backdated to May 1981, dividing the S&P 500 into
two groups and rebalancing the market cap of each groups every June and December,
exactly as if the index existed over this period. I refer to data before May 1992 as the
“control sample”, because index labeling is not expected to enter into firm’s payout
policy during this period, and data from May 1992 through 2003 is referred as the
“test sample.”
The threshold of BM is reset and the index is rebalanced every June and Decem-
ber. For the purpose of empirical tests, I define a new variable Z to be the distance
of a firm’s BM from the cut-off BM that defines the boundary between categories,
1http://marriottschool.net/emp/boyer/Research/barradata.html
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BM∗
Zi,t = BMi,t −BM∗t
The empirical sample consists of the S&P 500 firms from quarterly Compustat/CRSP
merged data of the period of 1981-2003. I use BM calculated from Compustat to
match S&P/Barra index data.
For the test of labeling effect on corporate policies, I analyze each corporate poli-
cies of dividend, repurchase, investment, R&D, leverage policy, saving, and employ-
ment. Dividend policy is measured by dividend payout ratio which is a ratio of
dividend per share to earning per share. Other frequently used payout measures in
recent literatures are dividend yield and payment rate, which measure the portion of
payers. These measures are used as substitutes for dividend payout ratio in the ro-
bustness test. Repurchase is defined as total expenditure on the purchase of common
and preferred stocks. Sale of common and preferred stock is subtracted from repur-
chase for the net repurchases. Following Fama and French (2001), net repurchases
are also considered with treasury stock. Not all repurchases are dividend substitutes.
Thus net repurchase is defined as the increment in common treasury stock if a firm
uses the treasury stock method for repurchases. Alternatively, the difference between
stock purchase and stock issuance is applied only if a firm has zero treasury stock
for eight consequent quarters. If either of the amounts is negative, repurchases are
set to zero. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. For
the estimation of dividend policy, profitability, investment opportunities and size are
considered as dividend factors which is consistent with Fama and French (2001) which
provide evidence of the difference between dividend payers and non-payers in term of
these three factors. Return on assets (ROA) measures profitability of firms, and the
coefficient on ROA is expected to be positive. Growth rate is measured by total assets
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change for investment opportunities, and the coefficient on growth rate is expected
to be negative. To control institutional block holder effect, institutional holdings are
also included in the payout estimation for the robustness test. Institutional holdings
are percentage of institution owned shares to total number of share outstanding which
are from Spectrum 13F filings. Every variable is windsorized top and bottom by 1
percent.
It is a possible hypothesis that employment depends on firms’ earnings distribution
decision, then these value may be affected by index labeling. Since only annual
data is available for these two variables, it may be hard to see the exact effect from
S&P/Barra index which has higher frequency. However, I compare these in graphs
which are shown in the appendix to illustrate how these will be shown with index
labeling. Annual data is matched with fourth quarter of quarterly data.
1.2.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 contains summary statistics for sample quarterly data from Compus-
tat/CRSP. The sample period is 1981 through 2003. The table report dividend pay-
out ratio, dividend yield, dividend payment rate, share repurchases, net repurchases,
normalized BM measure (Z), asset size, growth rate of assets, return on assets as a
proxy for profitability, capital investment, R&D, leverage, cash saving, institutional
holdings, number of employees, number of observation and the number of firms. All
financial values except leverage are scaled by total assets. Each section indicates
overall firms, control sample, test sample. Each column of control and test sample
section presents overall firms, growth index firms and value index firms. Test sample
in Table 2.1 indicates that average percentile size of value firms are about 12 per-
cents higher and average age is also about 3 years higher. While value firms show
lower growth rate by 2 percents and pay 9 percents higher dividend payout ratio than
7
Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table contains summary statistics for sample data from quarterly Compustat/CRSP merged data. The sample
period is 1981 through 2003. The table report dividend payout ratio, dividend yield, dividend payment rate, share
repurchases, net repurchases, normalized BM measure (Zi,t = BMi,t−BM∗t , where BM∗t is a threshold) , asset size,
growth rate of assets, return on assets as a proxy for profitability, capital investment, R&D, leverage, cash saving, num-
ber of employees, number of observation and the number of firms. All financial values are scaled by total assets, but
leverage. Each column indicate overall firms, control sample, test sample. Data before May 1992 is the “Control sam-
ple” and data from May 1992 through 2003 is the “Test sample.” Every variable is windsorized top and bottom by 1%.
Total Control Sample Test sample
Total Growth Value Total Growth Value
Dividend 36.7687 40.1714 34.1292 44.6107 33.6138 27.6787 36.0735
(50.8710) (53.9485) (38.8187) (62.4130) (47.6257) (36.5170) (51.3328)
Dividend Yield 0.6752 0.8548 0.5705 1.0635 0.5089 0.3359 0.5803
(0.5923) (0.6636) (0.4256) (0.7265) (0.4587) (0.3354) (0.4831)
Payment Rate 0.8364 0.8760 0.8696 0.8807 0.7996 0.7369 0.8255
(0.3700) (0.3296) (0.3367) (0.3242) (0.4003) (0.4404) (0.3796)
Repurchases 0.8694 0.5586 0.7942 0.3860 1.1572 2.0989 0.7684
(2.2801) (1.7935) (2.1843) (1.4168) (2.6196) (3.5317) (2.0075)
Net Repurchase 4.0425 2.0433 3.0780 1.2842 5.8914 10.3677 4.0383
(8.9414) (5.3527) (6.8593) (3.7142) (10.9672) (14.7427) (8.2690)
Z 0.1582 0.1303 -0.2610 0.4175 0.1841 -0.1206 0.3099
(0.4017) (0.4789) (0.2196) (0.4092) (0.3113) (0.1047) (0.2797)
Size Percentile 50.9096 50.9307 41.0996 58.1471 50.8900 42.8781 54.1975
(28.9021) (28.9984) (25.2486) (29.4493) (28.8133) (27.1708) (28.8233)
Growth Rate 1.6711 1.6564 2.9230 0.7280 1.6846 3.1083 1.0969
(8.8381) (8.2088) (7.8232) (8.3597) (9.3835) (8.8602) (9.5297)
ROA 1.2060 1.2684 2.1773 0.6021 1.1482 2.4517 0.6101
(2.8151) (2.2722) (2.2736) (2.0270) (3.2367) (2.7455) (3.2709)
Investment 3.1109 2.9899 3.9199 2.3082 3.2229 3.9195 2.9354
(3.8790) (4.0165) (4.4921) (3.4739) (3.7439) (3.5228) (3.7945)
R&D 0.3768 0.1594 0.1746 0.1482 0.5781 1.0148 0.3978
(1.1151) (0.7136) (0.7375) (0.6954) (1.3562) (1.7522) (1.1046)
Leverage 76.0068 74.9476 74.0160 75.6211 74.7522 70.7687 76.2961
(24.8720) (26.3517) (27.5393) (25.4388) (25.7493) (28.4831) (24.4353)
Saving 0.2395 0.1775 0.3469 0.0531 0.2969 0.6819 0.1380
(3.8590) (3.7008) (4.5428) (2.9267) (3.9991) (5.3754) (3.2534)
Age 25.2501 22.0541 21.1932 22.6861 28.2100 25.9587 29.1394
(8.7846) (5.7857) (6.2075) (5.3685) (9.9709) (10.9015) (9.4049)
Institutional Holdings 15.1315 6.9840 6.4775 7.4207 19.5593 18.3854 20.1134
(9.6284) (4.4179) (3.9522) (4.7402) (9.1473) (10.0176) (8.6518)
Employee 0.1582 38.5990 37.2163 39.5687 40.9903 48.0771 38.2484
(0.4017) (65.1845) (51.9270) (73.0547) (71.0857) (99.0675) (56.4482)
No. of firms 997 707 492 557 790 447 684
No. of Obs. 38332 18431 7802 10629 19901 5815 14086
growth firms, growth firms invest about 1 percent more fraction from total asset.
Value firms have lower profitability, growth rate, investment, and R&D than
growth index firms. One of the most prominent factors of dividend payment is prof-
itability. Fama and French (2001) suggest profitability is a factor of dividend payment.
However, the summary shows growth index firms have higher profitability than value
index firms, which seems inconsistent with other literature. Average ROA, yet, is
higher with dividend payout firms within categories. For example, within value index
firms of test sample, average ROA of firms who pay dividend is 2.4 percent while
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non-pay firms have 2.0 percent of ROA. Regression results for dividend policy also
show that ROA has significant positive effect which is consistent with other literature.
Of greater interest, the average value of dividend is higher in value index. Dividend
payout ratio in value index is 44.61 percent with control sample and 36.07 percent
with test sample, which is higher than 34.13 percent and 27.68 percent in growth
index.
1.3 Model/Methodology
This section describes how to adapt the regression discontinuity methodology to
an event study in order to estimate the effect of value and growth index on corporate
dividend policy.
1.3.1 Identification
Regression discontinuity design in this study satisfies required identifying assump-
tions.
1. Index labeling is solely a function of BM ratio. S&P/Barra indices
have simple rules for classify stocks as “growth” and “value” based on
BM ratio. No other variable can contaminate the labeling.
2. Firms do not know what kind of index they would be labeled as,
because the threshold is based on random components. S&P/Barra must
reset the boundary to rebalance the market cap of each index group. As
a result, the label of stocks can be switched to “value” after their BM
ratios actually decrease, or switched to “growth” after their BM ratios
actually increase. Thus labeling contains, at least near the cut-off, random
components. This is the key assumption of the local randomization. Lee
9
(2008) formally shows that as long as there is a random component to the
threshold, the assignment into each group is random around the threshold.
3. For the same reason, firms cannot manipulate their value to get a
specific label they want. Thus index membership does not suffer from
endogeneity issues. If firms can effectively choose the BM ratio for the
labeling, firms who choose above the threshold could be somewhat differ-
ent from those who below the threshold. It will invalidate the regression
discontinuity approach.
1.3.2 Regression Discontinuity in Dividend Policy
Suppose that a firm i have the value of book to market BMi,t at time t: If BMi,t is
larger than the threshold BM∗t , then this firm is labeled as a value firm and the firm
has the indicator Ii,t =1 (BMi,t > BM
∗). Let Zi,t = BMi,t − BM∗t , then the cut-off
value Z∗t based on the new measure Zi,t will be always zero. The effect of labeling on
an outcome Di,t can be written as
Di,t = α + Ii,tβ + f(Zi,t) + µi,t
where the coefficient β is the effect of index on the dividend payout Di,t and µi,t
represents all other determinants of the outcome (E(µi,t ) = 0). Ii,t is a dummy
variable indicating whether a firm is labelled “value” or “growth” based on a cut-off
value. Estimating these kind of regressions is problematic, when the labeling is a
highly endogenous outcome, and Ii,t is unlikely to be independent of the error term
(E(Ii,t, µi,t) 6= 0); the estimate of β will be biased. To get a consistent β, labeling
is ideally needed to be a randomly assigned variable. Since whether the value index
or growth index is random in a small interval around the discontinuity (where a cut-
off Z∗=0), the regression discontinuity framework helps me approximate this ideal
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setup. There is a random component to set the threshold of BM ratio, so that the
assignment into “growth” (Ii,t = 0) and “value” (Ii,t = 1) groups is random around
the threshold. This implies that the estimate of β using the regression discontinuity
design is not affected by omitted variables even if they are correlated with the BM
ratio, as long as their effect is continuous around the threshold. 2 Therefore, by
comparing the dividend of firms that barely have value index to the dividend of firms
that barely have growth index, I get a consistent estimate of the value of the labeling.
Global strategy of regression discontinuity is the methodology which use overall
data set, and it is also called parametric strategy. This methodology assume that I
can approximate the continuous underlying relationship between Di,t and Zi,t with a
continuous function of book to market ratio. This continuous function captures the
underlying relationship between any variable that is continuously affected by book to
market ratio and the dividend payout, and βˆ captures the discontinuity of dividend
payout at the threshold. Allowing for a different function for observations on the
left-hand side of the threshold f(Zi,t) and on the right-hand side of the threshold
g(Zi,t) gives
Di,t = α + Ii,tβ + f(Zi,t) + Ii,t · g(Zi,t) + ηt + λi + µi,t (1.1)
For example, following the standard approach (Lee and Lemiuex, 2010), I can as-
sume the relationship between Di,t and Zi,t as a quadratic polynomial, and the above
equation can be transferred as follows
Di,t = α + Ii,tβ + γ1Zi,t + γ2Ii,tZi,t + γ3Z
2
i,t + γ4Ii,tZ
2
i,t + ηt + λi + µi,t (1.2)
In addition to the polynomial regression model, I control firm specific characteristics
in (1.3). The parameter ηt contains fixed effects for the time periods of years and
2Continuity of other variables are revealed in section 1.4.7
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quarters, and λi is an industry fixed effect based on two-digit SIC code. Regression
discontinuity design does not require the control of other variables or fixed effect near
the cut-off if regression discontinuity design is valid. Moreover, Lee and Lemieux
(2010) argue that the use of other baseline covariates in an RD design is primarily to
reduce sampling variability. I control firm specific characteristics such as size, prof-
itability and growth rate as suggested by Fama and French (2001) to test robustness
with broad range near the cut-off. The equation extended with firm characteristics is
Di,t = α + Ii,tβ + γ1Zi,t + γ2Ii,tZi,t + γ3Z
2
i,t + γ4Ii,tZ
2
i,t +X
′
i,tθ + ηt + λi + µi,t (1.3)
where X contains firm specific characteristics.
Choice of polynomial order is an important consideration to use above polynomial
model, since linear or misspecified polynomial model may capture the curvature of
regression rather than discontinuity. In the empirical test section, various polynomial
orders, from a linear model up to polynomial of order of four on either side of the
threshold, are placed into the model to illustrate the robustness of results.
An alternative methodology is the use of local linear regressions. Local linear
estimation, which is called non-parametric strategy, is more flexible than global poly-
nomial regression, which is called non-parametric strategy, to fit various shapes. The
regression model is as follows
Di,t = α + Ii,tβ + γ1Zi,t + γ2Ii,tZi,t + µi,t, where − h ≤ Z ≤ h
for h > 0. The treatment effect is also captured by β. The choice of bandwidth, h,
is an important consideration, as choice of polynomial order in the global regression.
By using Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure as a benchmark for the choice
of bandwidth, I apply various bandwidths around the benchmark bandwidth into the
model for testing the robustness of results. By applying additional fixed effects, the
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above equation can be rewritten as
Di,t = α + Ii,tβ + γ1Zi,t + γ2Ii,tZi,t + ηt + λi + µi,t, where − h ≤ Z ≤ h (1.4)
The parameter ηt contains fixed effects for the time periods of years and quarters, and
λi is an industry fixed effect based on two-digit SIC code. I also extend regression
model (1.4) by controlling firm specific characteristics X for the robustness test.
Di,t = α+ Ii,tβ + γ1Zi,t + γ2Ii,tZi,t +X
′
i,tθ+ ηt + λi + µi,t, where − h ≤ Z ≤ h (1.5)
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Graphical Analysis for Regression Discontinuity
I begin the empirical analysis with a simple plot of the dividend payout ratio as
a function of BM ratio using information of S&P 500 listed firms during the control
(1981-1992) and the test (1992-2003) sample years. Figure 1.1 illustrates a graphi-
cal analysis for dividend payout policy to characterize regression discontinuity. Each
graph in the Figure 1.1 portrays a relationship that might exist between dividend
payout policy and BM ratio, which is normalized to Z value. Each dot shows the
average value of the dividend payout ratio for firms, in each bin with width 0.02,
against the BM ratio. The vertical line in the center of each graph designates a
cut-off point, above which firms are labeled “value” and below which firms are la-
beled “growth”. To show the detailed characteristics, the BM ratio limits within
0.4 near the threshold, which is twice the bandwidth value based on Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) for the regression discontinuity design. The first graph in Fig-
ure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between dividend payout ratio and BM ratio in
the control sample. As can be seen, the relationship is upward sloping to the right,
which indicates that dividend payout ratio increases as BM ratio increases. This
13
relationship passes continuously through the cut-off point, which implies that there
is no difference in dividend payout ratio for value or growth index firms which are
just above and below the cut-off point. The second graph in the Figure 1.1 illustrates
the relationship between dividend payout ratio and BM ratio in the test sample. In
the test sample period (after May 1992), by contrast, there is a sharp upward jump
at the cut-off point in the relationship, which intuitively supports that labeling effect
exist on dividend payout policy.
Figure 1.1: Dividend Payout Ratio
Conservatism in setting dividend may weaken the logic that dividend payout ratio
reflects payout policy. On the contrary, this conservatism shed light on labeling
effect for one side, only for value index. Conservatism in dividend comes from the
classic field survey of managers by Lintner (1956). Lintner reports that managers
are conservative in setting dividend policy. In particular, managers are reluctant to
14
make upward changes in dividends that may have to be reversed in the future. Fifty
years later, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) survey a larger number of
384 executives, and they report that managers are reluctant to cut dividends and
take the current level of dividend payments as given. Thus it is possible that firms
can increase dividend payout with value index due to investor’s sentiment, however,
it is hard to decrease payout from current level of dividend payout when the index
is changed to growth. On the other hand, firms may more rely on whether they pay
dividend, rather than how much they pay with reflecting on a notion of conservatism.
In addition to analyzing dividend payout ratio, average payment rate, which measure
how many firms are paying dividend, is taken for another measure of dividend policy
change.
Figure 1.2 illustrates a graphical analysis for average dividend payment rate to
characterize regression discontinuity. Each dot also shows the average dividend pay-
ment rate for firms in BM bin with width 0.02. The vertical line in the center of
each graph designates a cut-off point, and the BM ratio limits within 0.4 near the
threshold. The first graph in Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationship between dividend
payment rate and BM ratio in the control sample. This relationship passes continu-
ously through the cut-off point, which implies that there is no difference in dividend
payment rate for value or growth index firms that are just above and below the cut-
off point. The second graph in the Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationship between
dividend payment rate and BM ratio in the test sample. In this case, there is a
sharp upward jump at the cut-off point in the relationship, which is consistent with
the dividend payout ratio graph. Therefore, this figure support that firms are more
willing to payout dividend with value label.
15
Figure 1.2: Dividend Payment Rate
1.4.2 Estimation of Regression Discontinuity - Global strategy
Significant discontinuity of dividend policy with labeling is observed through the
global strategy. Table 1.2 contains global estimation results of sharp regression dis-
continuity in dividend payout ratio. Panel A presents standard global estimations of
regression discontinuity with various polynomial regressions which are based on equa-
tion (1.1) and equation (1.2). For the test sample, a significant index discontinuity
drive a jump of dividend payout ratio from 4.2 percent to 5 percent with the value
index. This implies that dividend payout ratio increases by about 4.2 to 5 percent
points when a firm has value label, where average payout ratio difference between
growth and value group in the test sample is about 8.4 percents. These coefficients
are significant through the different polynomial models. For the control sample, lin-
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ear and quadratic models show significant value of discontinuity (7.81, 3.72), however,
higher orders of polynomial models do not show discontinuity. With broad range of
entire sample, as it named global strategy, linear and quadratic models may capture
the curvature of regression rather than discontinuity. Moreover, regressions with dif-
ferent polynomial show inconsistent coefficient, while coefficients in the test sample
are relatively consistent.
Robustness tests are performed in Panel B, and the tests also indicate that the
index has a positive treatment effect on dividend payout ratios during the test sample
period. Panel B controls for firms’ other characteristics such as profitability, growth
rate of assets and size, which are dividend factors suggested by Fama and Frech
(2001). Institutional holdings are also controlled for as another factor influencing
dividend policy. Both Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Crane, Michenaud, and
Weston (2014) suggest institutional holdings, but they have opposite expectation for
the relationship between institutional holdings and dividend payout. Equation (1.3)
is applied for this test. A robustness test with firm characteristics shows consistent
result (from 4.39 to 5.38), and these values are statistically not different. Other
variables are also significant for dividend payout. More profitable firms and big firms
payout more, and growing firms invest more instead of payout. In regards to the
institutional ownership, there is negative correlation between institutional holdings
and dividend payout. The result is consistent with Grinstein and Michaely (2005),
and contrary to Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014).
As Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out, a possible disadvantage of the paramet-
ric/global estimation approach is that it provides a regression over the entire range
of BM ratios, while the regression continuity design depends on local estimates of
the regression function at the cut-off point. The fact that global regression models
use data far away from the cut-off point to predict the value of dividend near the
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Table 1.3: Estimation of Sharp Regression Discontinuity - Local Strategy
This table contains linear regression result for dividend payout ratio within a range of cut-off value. Panel A presents
standard local estimation of regression discontinuity with bandwidth 0.2 which are based on bandwidth selector
procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). On the top of the bandwidth 0.2, ±0.05 of the bandwidth are
applied for the robustness. Equation (1.4) is applied for this test. Panel B additionally control firms’ other specifics
such as profitability, growth rate of assets and size, which are possible factors for dividend payout. Equation (1.5)
is applied for this robustness test. The estimations include year fixed effect, quarter fixed effect and industry fixed
effect which is based on two digit SIC. The sample period is 1981 through 2003. Data before May 1992 is the
“Control sample” and data from May 1992 through 2003 is the “Test sample.” All data are from the quarterly
Compustat/CRSP. The associated standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
A. Standard Test
Control Sample Test Sample
Bandwidth +0.05 0 -0.05 +0.05 0 -0.05
Index -0.726 -1.9434 -0.9419 3.6121*** 3.4070** 4.5890***
(2.2349) (2.5486) (2.9922) (1.3931) (1.5460) (1.7374)
No. of Obs. 8539 6743 4942 15720 10905 8656
R-Squared 0.079 0.072 0.069 0.131 0.134 0.132
B. Extended Test
Control Sample Test Sample
Bandwidth +0.05 0 -0.05 +0.05 0 -0.05
Index 0.8460 0.4106 1.1883 3.6690** 4.0016** 5.2793***
(2.7144) (3.1051) (3.6346) (1.5602) (1.7497) (1.9748)
Z 47.3375*** 59.4743*** 32.9905 25.9536** 28.0553** 26.0176
(12.8395) (18.1674) (27.6778) (10.8090) (12.4394) (16.6142)
ROA (0.5987) (0.7135) -1.5532** 0.7467*** 0.5467*** 0.4133*
(0.4652) (0.5394) (0.6257) (0.1860) (0.2022) (0.2205)
Growth Rate -0.1255* (0.0374) (0.0801) -0.1469*** -0.1348*** -0.1285***
(0.0694) (0.0813) (0.0944) (0.0341) (0.0362) (0.0389)
Size 0.0456 0.0224 (0.0043) 0.1237*** 0.0886*** 0.0966***
(0.0308) (0.0354) (0.0410) (0.0185) (0.0202) (0.0221)
Inst. Holdings -0.5483*** -0.5970*** -0.8565*** -0.3807*** -0.4412*** -0.4641***
(0.1776) (0.2038) (0.2362) (0.0548) (0.0609) (0.0669)
Const 64.6733*** 64.7418*** 66.2452*** 11.6070 13.7812 15.0307*
(7.4964) (8.0917) (9.0102) (9.5881) (8.9944) (8.9706)
No. of Obs. 5362 4199 3085 11254 8073 6467
R-Squared 0.084 0.08 0.095 0.124 0.133 0.14
cut-off point is not intuitively appealing. That said, trying more flexible specification
by adding polynomials in BM ratio as regressors into the standard linear model is
an important and useful way of assessing the robustness of the RD estimates of the
treatment effect. Moreover, it is recommended to check both global and local model
when implementing a regression discontinuity design.
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1.4.3 Estimation of Regression Continuity - Local Strategy
In addition to the parametric/global estimation approach, non-parametric/local
estimation approach is also applied near the cut-off value of Z. Consistent to global
estimation, significant discontinuity from dividend policy is captured through overall
local estimations. The local regression results for dividend payout ratio within a range
of cut-off value are presented in Table 1.3. Panel A contains standard local estima-
tion of regression discontinuity with bandwidth 0.2 that derived from the bandwidth
selecting procedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). While the entire range of
Z is from -3.18 to 4.88, local bandwidth 0.2 near the cut-off value contains about
46.2 percent of observations (36.7% in control sample and 55% in test sample). On
the top of the bandwidth 0.2, ±0.05 of the bandwidth are applied for the robust-
ness. Equation (1.4) is applied for this test. For the test sample, a significant index
discontinuity drive a jump of dividend payout ratio from 3.4 percent to 4.6 percent
with the value index. These coefficients are significant at least at the 5 percent level
through the different bandwidth. For the control sample, no significant discontinuity
is observed with any bandwidth values.
Both panels indicate that labeling has a positive effect on dividend payout ratio
only for the test sample. These consistent results support that labeling has an effect
on demand of dividend by providing information to the investors. Compared to the
global strategy, local strategy captures less effect of labeling, however, the values are
all within one standard error range, so the difference is statistically insignificant.
1.4.4 Changes in the Dividend Policy and Labeling
In addition to the static dividend policy measurement, I evaluate the effects of
labeling on changes in the dividend policy. Evaluating these real effects are important
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Table 1.4: Change of Dividend Payout - Within Firm Effect for Index Switchers
This table contains linear regression result for change of dividend payout ratio within a range of cut-off value. Panel
A presents standard local estimation of regression discontinuity with bandwidth 0.17 which are based on bandwidth
selector procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). On the top of the bandwidth 0.17, ±0.05 of the bandwidth
are applied for the robustness. Equation (1.4) is applied for this test. Panel B uses index change dummies. If a firm
change the index from “growth” to “value”, then the firm assigned as G to V, V to G if a firm’s label switches the
other way. If a firm does not have previous index data, the firm is dropped. Panel C additionally control firms’
other specifics such as profitability, growth rate of assets and size, which are possible factors for dividend payout.
The estimations include year fixed effect, quarter fixed effect and industry fixed effect which is based on two digit
SIC. The sample period is 1981 through 2003. Data before May 1992 is the “Control sample” and data from May
1992 through 2003 is the “Test sample.” All data are from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP. The associated standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
A. Standard Test
Control Sample Test Sample
Bandwidth 0.05 0 -0.05 0.05 0 -0.05
Index -3.1414 -4.0135 -3.9149 1.1388 0.7463 -0.0558
(2.7842) (3.1984) (3.7861) (1.7991) (1.9456) (2.1795)
No. of Obs. 8528 6733 4933 12618 10884 8639
R-Squared 0.118 0.105 0.1 0.171 0.174 0.171
B. Standard Test for Index Change
Control Sample Test Sample
Bandwidth 0.05 0 -0.05 0.05 0 -0.05
G to V -1.3584 -3.8357 -3.1872 7.0202* 5.9778 6.7021
(5.2242) (5.7083) (6.4051) (4.0588) (4.1266) (4.3154)
V to G -8.4367 -9.7248 -8.6575 1.4005 2.3554 1.5327
(5.8044) (6.3715) (7.1494) (4.2394) (4.3032) (4.5539)
Const 1.0721 4.1864 -1.1361 3.3019 3.8333 3.0998
(9.8981) (10.7004) (12.1349) (11.9043) (11.7352) (11.5227)
No. of Obs. 8249 6512 4762 12399 10685 8467
R-Squared 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.009
C. Extended Test for Index Change
Control Sample Test Sample
Bandwidth 0.05 0 -0.05 0.05 0 -0.05
G to V -1.3895 -3.8959 -3.1284 7.1334* 6.0982 6.828
(5.2249) (5.7098) (6.4070) (4.0573) (4.1254) (4.3168)
V to G -7.4878 -8.6703 -7.1483 1.4811 2.4142 1.5715
(5.8289) (6.4019) (7.1912) (4.2374) (4.3014) (4.5543)
Z 0.6746 1.0371 0.6127 2.4694 5.4244 9.878
(5.3120) (7.2453) (10.9882) (4.2851) (5.1815) (6.9124)
ROA -0.4942 -0.0365 -0.0647 0.6342*** 0.6844*** 0.6761***
(0.5084) (0.5915) (0.6966) (0.2188) (0.2317) (0.2499)
Growth rate -0.0277 -0.0354 -0.111 -0.0022 -0.0008 0.0232
(0.0733) (0.0839) (0.1012) (0.0386) (0.0412) (0.0437)
Size -0.0285 -0.0098 -0.0418 0.0225 0.0233 0.0199
(0.0329) (0.0377) (0.0446) (0.0208) (0.0218) (0.0236)
Const 3.1777 5.5555 1.8554 2.2221 2.7425 2.0777
(9.9590) (10.7715) (12.2354) (11.9077) (11.7407) (11.5363)
No. of Obs. 8239 6504 4757 12379 10670 8457
R-Squared 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.01
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for determining whether the firms’ payout ratio increases following the switching of
index categories, especially for those switching from “growth” to “value”. The changes
in the dividend policy are applied into regression discontinuity design of equation 1.4.
Thus the changes in the dividend policy is defined as follows
∆Di,t(= Di,t−Di,t−1) = α+Ii,tβ+γ1Zi,t+γ2Ii,tZi,t+ηt+λi+µi,t, where −h ≤ Z ≤ h.
(1.6)
Changes in the dividend payout are presented on the first panel of Table 1.4, but it
is hard to address that the results provide an evidence of labeling effect. This test
does not take into account changes of labeling whether a firm’s label stays in value
or changes to value.
To show changes of dividend policy in actual index switching effect, I divide firms
into three groups, which are “growth to value”, “value to growth”, and “stay in
the same index”. The second panel presents the behavior of actual label switchers.
The total observation of switchers are small, where growth to value switchers are
4.5 percents and value to growth switchers are 3.6 percents of the sample. Yet,
these switchers are clustered in the local bandwidth of 0.2. While the bandwidth
contains 46.2 percent of total observations, 88.7 percent of switchers are located in
the bandwidth. The switching index of “growth to value” does not show significantly
positive dividend payout effects from the labeling for the all bandwidth choices. Even
though various bandwidth show consistent result with relatively small coefficient of
variation, the test with wider bandwidth only shows significant coefficient. The third
panel shows the robust test results by controlling additional firm characteristics.
From panel A, original “value” index does not explain labeling effect with new
index for switchers, instead of index itself, consistent change of dividend payout ratio
is estimated from panel B, and C. It simply says, if a firm were in growth index with
20% of payout ratio, the firm increases the payout ratio to 26% by shifting into the
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Table 1.5: Regression Discontinuity - Dividend Payers Only
This table contains linear regression result for dividend payout ratio with dividend payers only. Local estimation
of regression discontinuity with bandwidth 0.20 which are based on bandwidth selector procedure by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). On the top of the bandwidth 0.20, ±0.05 of the bandwidth are applied for the robustness.
Equation (1.5) is applied for this test. The estimations include year fixed effect, quarter fixed effect and industry
fixed effect which is based on two digit SIC. The sample period is 1981 through 2003. Data before May 1992 is
the “Control sample” and data from May 1992 through 2003 is the “Test sample.” All data are from the quarterly
Compustat/CRSP. The associated standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Extended Local Regression Discontinuity with Dividend Payers Only
Control Sample Test Sample
Bandwidth +0.05 0 -0.05 +0.05 0 -0.05
Index -0.0409 -0.2097 0.4098 4.9916*** 3.8213* 4.9867**
(2.8608) (3.2618) (3.7970) (1.9056) (2.0333) (2.2988)
Z 47.0102*** 61.1063*** 42.6881 2.4295 14.2720 10.2880
(13.7174) (19.3379) (28.9927) (12.6041) (14.7242) (19.9040)
ROA -2.0840*** -2.2216*** -2.9387*** 0.0129 0.0660 (0.0323)
(0.5334) (0.6113) (0.6905) (0.2688) (0.2795) (0.3113)
Growth rate -0.1266* (0.0435) (0.0813) -0.1159*** -0.1324*** -0.1238**
(0.0726) (0.0836) (0.0964) (0.0438) (0.0457) (0.0496)
Size (0.0453) -0.0618* -0.0775* (0.0118) (0.0118) 0.0039
(0.0328) (0.0374) (0.0430) (0.0227) (0.0236) (0.0260)
Inst. Holdings -0.4058** -0.4519** -0.6953*** -0.2720*** -0.3023*** -0.3329***
(0.1959) (0.2225) (0.2551) (0.0730) (0.0768) (0.0849)
Const 73.5291*** 74.5574*** 73.2704*** 10.9611 13.3075 14.2822
(7.9863) (8.6139) (9.4188) (9.6434) (9.4610) (9.4818)
No. of Obs. 4913 3865 2853 7567 6563 5207
R-Squared 0.082 0.083 0.102 0.096 0.104 0.111
value index. Among all the dividend policy factors, only profitability has possible
explanation power for change in dividend payout ratio.
Although the coefficients in panel B and C in Table 1.4 consistently show positive
labeling effect it does not support enough for labeling effect with index switcher sam-
ple. “value to growth” does not show negative effect as expected from conservatism
in setting dividend, even though these coefficients are not significant. I additionally
check local discontinuity design with dividend payers only, and the result is shown in
Table 1.5. For this test, firm quarters that do not show dividend payout, about 15
percent of sample, are dropped from each group.
1.4.5 Alternative Measure of Dividend Policy - Payment Decision
In addition to the regression discontinuity design with dividend payout ratio, Ta-
ble 1.6 reports robustness test using three different setup with payment decision,
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Table 1.6: Logit Result
This table contains logit regression result for dividend payment. Index increases dividend payment rate only for
the test sample. Regression methods control firm’s other specifications such as BM , profitability, growth rate of
assets and size. Column (A) shows test result of logit with payment decision. For robustness purpose, column (B)
replace dividend payout ratio to payment decision in regression discontinuity with the same bandwidth, while column
(C) control firms’ other specifications which are included in column (A) results. All data are from the quarterly
Compustat/CRSP. The sample period is 1981 through 2003. Data before May 1992 is the “Control sample” and data
from May 1992 through 2003 is the “Test sample.” The estimations include year fixed effect, quarter fixed effect and
industry fixed effect which is based on two digit SIC. The associated standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Index* is original index from S&P/Barra, while Index refers matched value/growth index.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Control Sample Test Sample
A. Matched Data Set
(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
Index 0.3291*** 0.1311 0.0712 0.7732*** 0.3590*** 0.2825**
(0.0989) (0.2177) (0.2878) (0.0734) (0.1131) (0.1411)
Z 0.0356 -0.0852 0.6324 -0.1984* 1.3144** 2.1576***
(0.0948) (0.9143) (1.1943) (0.1108) (0.5364) (0.6850)
ROA 0.1899*** 0.1799*** 0.1077*** 0.0756***
(0.0168) (0.0374) (0.0109) (0.0154)
Growth rate 0.001 0.0041 -0.0072*** -0.0087***
(0.0036) (0.0071) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Size 0.0299*** 0.0210*** 0.0245*** 0.0248***
(0.0017) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0017)
Inst. Holdings 0.0051 -0.0562*** -0.0311*** -0.0443***
(0.0074) (0.0159) (0.0034) (0.0046)
Const 2.6021*** 3.0830*** 2.5414*** 0.486 3.3498*** 1.3991***
(0.4920) (0.6160) (0.6896) (0.4377) (0.4834) (0.5339)
No. of Obs. 10200 6084 3310 13003 10472 7299
pseudo R-sq 0.214 0.181 0.241 0.242 0.212 0.276
B. Premitive Data Set
(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
Index* 0.3466*** 0.0183 0.1611 0.6919*** 0.3348*** 0.3723***
(0.0853) (0.1186) (0.1539) (0.0662) (0.0757) (0.0974)
Z 0.0369 0.2249 0.0415 -0.0877 1.3378*** 1.7568***
(0.0856) (0.5256) (0.6732) (0.1065) (0.3794) (0.4991)
ROA 0.2061*** 0.2213*** 0.1132*** 0.0847***
(0.0165) (0.0342) (0.0108) (0.0148)
Growth rate -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0081*** -0.0094***
(0.0034) (0.0061) (0.0020) (0.0025)
Size 0.0277*** 0.0185*** 0.0244*** 0.0243***
(0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0015)
Inst. Holdings 0.001 -0.0634*** -0.0343*** -0.0495***
(0.0071) (0.0144) (0.0032) (0.0043)
Const 2.4510*** 3.1186*** 2.4627*** 0.486 3.2840*** 1.2158**
(0.4268) (0.5226) (0.5719) (0.4359) (0.4784) (0.5157)
No. of Obs. 11550 7512 4145 14097 12120 8365
pseudo R-sq 0.222 0.197 0.258 0.244 0.215 0.28
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whether a firm pay dividend or not, in Panel A. For the binary payment variable,
the robustness test borrows logit model following Fama and French (2001). As they
test payment with three factors; profitability, growth rate, and size, the first robust-
ness test is based on the three factors with index and normalized BM ratio, Z, and
check whether the index has significant effect. The result of this estimation can be
found in column (A). Column (B) shows the result of the logit which based on re-
gression discontinuity model. Thus, payment decision replaces dividend payout ratio
in regression with the same 0.2 bandwidth near the cut-off value of Z, which means
only index and Z are controlled for dividend payment decision. Column (C) shows a
robustness test with the extended regression discontinuity model which additionally
controls three dividend factors and also limits the 0.2 range of Z near the cut-off
value. Column (A) shows significant labeling effect for both of the control and the
test sample, however, index coefficient may capture systematical difference across two
groups, rather than the labeling itself. This is a reason why this paper applies regres-
sion discontinuity design which does not suffer from this problem. Column (B) and
(C) shows significantly positive coefficient from only test sample.
When matching the original data with S&P/Barra index, eight percent of data
was mismatched and dropped for the regression discontinuity test. However, the logit
test does not require the same assumption as regression discontinuity regression. Thus
Panel B uses original data with S&P/Barra index. No matter what kind of data sets
are used and however it models, the results are quite consistent.
1.4.6 The Robustness Test Utilizing an additional Time Period
S&P/Barra index is generated until Barra has merged into MSCI in 2003. If the
discontinuity is coming from systematical difference from book to market ratio, then
discontinuity may exist with S&P/Barra measure even though labeling based on book
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to market ratio is not exist. Even though control sample periods can test this sys-
tematic difference, this section also consider the possibility that systematic differences
which exist after control sample periods. The sample for the test is S&P firms after
S&P/Barra stop generate growth/value index. I generate the index constituent data
from April 2003 to June 2014, dividing the S&P 500 into two groups and rebalancing
the groups every June and December, exactly as if the indices existed over this period.
Figure 1.3 illustrates a graphical analysis for dividend payout policy and divi-
dend payment rate after test sample years. Each graph in the Figure 1.3 portrays
a relationship that might exist between dividend payout policy and BM ratio. As
it shows in control and test sample, each dot shows the average value of dividend
payout ratio within bin-width 0.02. To show the detailed characteristics, the Z limits
within 0.4 near the threshold, which is twice the bandwidth value based on Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) for the regression discontinuity design. 61.5% of samples
are located within this bandwidth. The relationship between dividend payout ratio
and BM ratio is upward sloping to the right. It is also observable from payment rate
graph. It is hard to address that discontinuity exist at the cut-off. On the contrary,
smooth continuous relationship is shown within this bandwidth.
Table 1.7 contains global estimation results of sharp regression discontinuity in
dividend payout ratio after test sample periods. Left four columns presents stan-
dard global estimations of regression discontinuity with various polynomial regressions
which are based on equation (1.1) and equation (1.2). Right four columns addition-
ally control firms’ other specifics such as boot to market, profitability, growth rate of
assets and size. Equation (1.3) is applied for this test. Cubic and quartic polynomial
models show significant value of discontinuity (-0.83, -1.392) in basic model. Cubic
polynomial model in extended model shows significant discontinuity (1.5038), which
is not consistent with basic model. Moreover, higher orders of polynomial models do
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Figure 1.3: Dividend Payout Rate and Payment Rate after Test Sample Periods
not show discontinuity.
The local regression results for dividend payout ratio after S&P/Barra stop gen-
erating style index are presented in Table 1.8. Left three columns present standard
local estimation of regression discontinuity with bandwidth 0.2 which are based on
bandwidth selector procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). On the top of
the bandwidth 0.2, ±0.05 of the bandwidth are applied for the robustness. Equa-
tion (1.4) is applied for this test. Right three columns additionally control firms’
other specifics such as profitability, growth rate of assets and size, which are possible
factors for dividend payout. Equation (1.5) is applied for this robustness test. No
significant discontinuity is observed with basic test, and only wide bandwidth choice
shows significant result in extended model.
28
In sum, systematic difference, which may exist based on index labeling, does not
drive consistent discontinuity in dividend payout policy from both of global strategy
and local strategy after S&P/Barra stop generating style index.
1.4.7 Share Repurchases and Other Corporate Policies
Dividend may not be the only policy which is affected by labeling. Other policies,
which may be affected by investor sentiment, are also possible considerations for this
labeling effect study such as repurchases, institutional ownership. Other corporate
policies as investment, leverage, R&D, cash saving, and employment are tested in the
section for the placebo effect. 3 If dividend discontinuity is happened by placebo
3In addition to checking other variables which might related with assignment variable, McCrary
(2006) shows the density test is useful to check internal validity for manipulation incentive. This
density is shown in the appendix section as a Figure A.1. However, it is hard to say that this
density test provides meaningful result for this paper. That is because McCrary density test require
monotonic incentive to manipulation, otherwise the test result say nothing about manipulation.
Table 1.8: Local Strategy after Test Sample Periods
This table contains linear regression result for dividend payout ratio within a range of cut-off value after S&P/Barra
stop generating style index. Left three columns present standard local estimation of regression discontinuity with
bandwidth 0.2 which are based on bandwidth selector procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). On the top
of the bandwidth 0.2, ±0.05 of the bandwidth are applied for the robustness. Equation (1.4) is applied for this test.
Right three columns additionally control firms’ other specifics such as profitability, growth rate of assets and size,
which are possible factors for dividend payout. Equation (1.5) is applied for this robustness test. The estimations
include year fixed effect, quarter fixed effect and industry fixed effect which is based on two digit SIC. The sample
period is 2003 through 2014. All data are from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP. The associated standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Basic Extended
Bandwidth +0.05 0 -0.05 +0.05 0 -0.05
Index 0.0637 -0.2735 -0.0378 1.7917** 0.9682 0.7792
(0.5591) (0.6203) (0.7114) (0.7123) (0.7791) (0.8805)
Z -1.6170 4.5793 -0.1008
(3.8332) (5.0464) (7.4031)
ROA 0.3026*** 0.3075*** 0.2691***
(0.0297) (0.0337) (0.0374)
Growth Rate -0.1306*** -0.1363*** -0.1560***
(0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0155)
Size 0.3456*** 0.3582*** 0.3822***
(0.0099) (0.0108) (0.0121)
Inst. Holdings -0.2950*** -0.3188*** -0.3558***
(0.0149) (0.0161) (0.0181)
Const 2.6577 5.2278 2.1233 -11.4211*** -8.7121* -8.9694*
(3.5908) (3.9910) (4.4960) (4.4309) (4.7376) (5.2329)
No. of Obs. 145462 120319 92415 84873 70883 54920
R-Squared 0.125 0.124 0.127 0.189 0.193 0.204
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effect from labeling, that other corporate policies, which are not related with investor
sentiment, are also affected by index labeling. Figure 1.6, Figure 1.7, and Table 1.9
show the graphical and empirical analysis for the discontinuity of these variables.
Repurchases
As Skinner (2008) tests substitution of repurchases and dividend policy, share re-
purchases are another method of transferring wealth to investors. However, share
repurchases do not have conservatism as dividend policy does. Firms can choose how
much to repurchases more flexibly than dividend payout. What kind of distribution
methods a firm will take depends on the firm’s own characteristics. Which types of
firms use repurchases more for the earnings distribution can be shown in Figure 1.4
and Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.4 illustrates how dividend policies change in growth and value index firms
through time. It shows that value firms use dividend payout flexibly, and growth
firms do not use dividend flexibly as value firms. The top graph displays the equally
weighted average of dividend payout rate for firms by labeling, while the second graph
displays the same dividend payout ratio with only dividend payers. The vertical line
divides the sample period into the control and test subsamples. In the first graph,
the average growth firms have more stable dividend payout ratio than the average
value firms, and this trend is more transparent in the second graph, which counts
on only dividend payers. On the other side, in the dividend payment case, there is
more significant downward change within growth index firms. On average, value firms
manage more on their dividend payout rather than the payment decision whether they
pay or not, while growth firms have relatively low and conservative dividend payout
ratio and simply do not pay dividend. This can be seen in the bottom graph which
shows how many firms are paying dividend in each year.
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Figure 1.4: Time Trends in Dividend Policy
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Figure 1.5: Time Trends in Share Repurchases
In terms of repurchases, growth firms use repurchases more often than average
value firms, which can be shown in Figure 1.5. The first graph illustrates the equally
weighted average of share repurchases for firms through time, and the second graph
displays the equally weighted average of net share repurchase with considering trea-
sury stock issuance for firms through time. Both graphs clearly show the higher rate
of repurchases for growth firms while value firms present a relatively lower rate of
repurchases. The comparison of these two figures provides graphical evidence for the
substitution of dividend and repurchase methods, and which kinds of firms prefer
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to use share repurchase for their earnings distribution. Growth firms prefer share
repurchases while value firms prefer dividend payout method.
Figure 1.6: Dividend and Repurchase Policy
In Figure 1.6, regression discontinuity design is applied to repurchases based on
distance to the threshold of book to market ratio, Z, and the graphical result is
shown with other corporate policies. The first top left graph is for dividend yield,
and the bottom left graph is for dividend per share as a robustness test of dividend
payout policy. Share repurchases and net share repurchases do not provide visual
discontinuity as clearly as other dividend policies. Repurchases may not depend on
‘Investor sentiment’ but rather on their actual earnings and re-investment level.
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One of the fundamental value, which categorize firms into the two groups, is BM
ratio. The bottom middle graph indicates that the BM ratio is continuous at the
cut off. Profitability is one factor Fama and French(1997) use for the dividend policy
test. It is hard to convince that the profitability has a discontinuity at the cut off
from the graphical analysis from the bottom right graph in Figure 1.6.
Empirical test results are presented in Table 1.9. A jump in the graph is not
enough to address meaningful discontinuity, but estimation results in Panel B and C
provide some evidence for the possible discontinuity of repurchases. The discontinuity
is not consistently shown as dividend policy and even signs are not consistent in net
repurchases with various bandwidths, especially larger the bandwidth contains the
bigger discontinuity in the local test. However, this may happen even if regression
discontinuity is not valid, because the larger bandwidth may contains some system-
atical differences between growth and value categories. Thus it is hard to conclude
that the repurchase policy shows the labeling effect with discontinuity.
Institutional Share Holdings
Institutional holdings are one of the factors which can affect earnings distribution
policy.
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that institu-
tional holdings do not affect firms’ policy. While Grinstein and Michaely (2005) show
one-way causality from dividend payout to institutional holdings, Crane, Michenaud,
and Weston (2014) show how institutional holdings affect dividend payout policy.
They use Russell index to show the effect of institutional ownership on payout policy
with Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indices, which are based on market capitalization.
The largest 1000 firms are the Russell 1000 index while the next 2000 make up the
Russell 2000, thus a total of 3000 firms are considered in the index. It is plausi-
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Table 1.9: Regression Discontinuity Test for Corporate Policies
This table contains global and local estimation of sharp regression discontinuity result for corporate policies. Left
three columns of each panel present global estimation of regression discontinuity with various polynomial regression
methods which are based on equation (1.1) and equation (1.2). Right three columns of each panel present linear
regression result for corporate policies within a range of cut-off value. These column presents standard local
estimation of regression discontinuity with bandwidth which are based on bandwidth selector procedure by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012). Each panel has bandwidth value in the parenthesis with variable name. On the top of
the bandwidth, ±0.05 of the bandwidth are applied for the robustness. Equation (1.4) is applied for this test. All
data are from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP. The test sample period is 1992 through 2003. Dividend payout ratio
increase in index dummy which support that value index affect demand of dividend by providing information to the
investors. The estimations include year fixed effect, quarter fixed effect and industry fixed effect which is based on
two digit SIC. The associated standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Global Test Local Test
Quadratic Cubic Quartic +0.05 0 -0.05
Panel A. Dividend Yield (0.11)
Index 0.0409*** 0.0361*** 0.0330* 0.0417*** 0.0509*** 0.0697***
(0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0169) (0.0125) (0.0147) (0.0205)
No. of Obs. 19901 19901 19901 9176 6428 3270
R-Squared 0.41 0.41 0.411 0.383 0.387 0.392
Panel B. Repurchase (0.18)
Index -0.2204*** -0.0381 -0.2469** -0.1954* -0.1767 -0.0761
(0.074) (0.0898) (0.1105) (0.1000) (0.1136) (0.1357)
No. of Obs. 17666 17666 17666 10540 8772 6560
R-Squared 0.235 0.235 0.236 0.234 0.235 0.249
Panel C. Net repurchase (0.15)
Index -0.2467 0.2226 -0.8836* -0.9726** -0.7282 -0.7347
(0.2999) (0.3670) (0.4513) (0.4483) (0.5185) (0.6374)
N 19766 19766 19766 9527 7510 5005
R-sq 0.267 0.267 0.268 0.293 0.288 0.282
Panel D. Institutional Holdings (0.14)
Index 0.9899*** 0.8830*** 0.6482 0.5685* 0.358 -0.2687
(0.269) (0.3278) (0.4025) (0.3337) (0.3879) (0.4918)
No. of Obs. 12596 12596 12596 6805 5277 3397
R-Squared 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.453 0.461 0.475
Panel E. Investment (0.20)
Index -0.0997 -0.0004 -0.168 0.0079 0.0208 0.0203
(0.0871) (0.1065) (0.131) (0.0964) (0.1058) (0.1193)
No. of Obs. 19867 19867 19867 12670 10922 8668
R-Squared 0.467 0.468 0.468 0.496 0.499 0.508
Panel F. R&D (0.18)
Index -0.0874** -0.0012 -0.0613 -0.0345 -0.0477 -0.1016
(0.0351) (0.0429) (0.0528) (0.0464) (0.0527) (0.0619)
No. of Obs. 19867 19867 19867 12025 10038 7551
R-Squared 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.33 0.321 0.312
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Table 1.9: Continued
Global Test Local Test
Quadratic Cubic Quartic +0.05 0 -0.05
Panel G. Leverage (0.17)
Index 0.8693 0.4458 3.3769*** 1.3646 2.3673** 1.6622
(0.7309) (0.8925) (1.0987) (0.9317) (1.0520) (1.2622)
No. of Obs. 19190 19190 19190 11159 9162 6675
R-Squared 0.243 0.243 0.244 0.209 0.196 0.197
Panel H. Saving (0.21)
Index -0.2663** -0.2692* -0.2792 -0.1915 -0.2455 -0.2641
(0.1173) (0.1425) (0.1753) (0.1444) (0.1538) (0.1722)
No. of Obs. 17695 17695 17695 11427 9902 7988
R-Squared 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.02 0.021
Panel I. Size percentile (0.21)
Index -0.6528 0.4131 1.6874 -0.5138 -0.3157 -0.0128
(0.7248) (0.8798) (1.0821) (0.8277) (0.9119) (1.0463)
N 17698 17698 17698 11430 9905 7990
R-sq 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.433 0.425 0.415
Panel J. Log(size) (0.15)
Index -0.0076 0.0347 0.0914* 0.0275 0.0228 0.0611
(0.0344) (0.0417) (0.0513) (0.0428) (0.0495) (0.0615)
N 17666 17666 17666 9569 7548 5030
R-sq 0.52 0.521 0.521 0.511 0.509 0.518
Panel K. Employee (0.19)
Index -14.4053*** -9.1344 -10.0502 -7.2189 -4.0819 -2.7331
(4.5486) (5.8777) (7.1046) (5.4873) (6.4106) (7.4849)
No. of Obs. 4320 4320 4320 2587 2177 1664
R-Squared 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.35 0.347 0.362
Panel L. Employment growth (0.20)
Index -3.2736** -2.8156 -2.5116 -1.6572 -1.7942 -2.5186
(1.6467) (2.1259) (2.5689) (1.8639) (2.0860) (2.5556)
No. of Obs. 4289 4289 4289 2632 2266 1772
R-Squared 0.06 0.061 0.061 0.071 0.076 0.071
ble that institutions pay more attention on leading firms in Russell 2000 than firms
which barely stay in the Russell 1000. Since Russell 1000 covers over 90 percent of
the total market capitalization of all listed U.S. stocks, institutions may look more on
the leading firms from Russell 2000 when they need to invest on Russell 2000 firms.
Moreover, Russell index methodology also shows more weight on higher market cap
firms in each Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indices. Since index weights more on
large firms in each group, thus institutions, whether they are active or passive in-
vestor, take note of the leading firms of Russell 2000 than the tail of Russell 1000 as
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long as they care about Russell index. They use regression discontinuity design for
index inclusion into Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 to use the index as an instrument
variable of institutional holdings.
Different level of institutional holding is also expected from labeling within S&P/Barra
index data, because institution is one of the biggest investors. If the labeling affects
individual investors’ sentiments, then it is also expected to have an effect on institu-
tional holdings. However, empirical results does not support the difference with S&P
500 data. Even though institution holding does not show discontinuity, I control for
it in the analysis of dividend payout policy.
Figure 1.6 contains the graphical result of institutional holdings with S&P 500
firms. It does not have visual jump near the cut-off. Moreover, the method on
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 in Conversely, Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014)
include only 10 to 35 firms near the cut-off, which arise the issue of external validity.
Figure 1.6 contains bandwidth of ± 0.2 near the cut-off, which based on Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012), and this bandwidth contains about half of total S&P 500
observation. This alleviates the external validity issue. In spite of the significant
effect of institutional holding on divided payout policy seen in Table 1.2 and 1.3, it
is difficult to conceive that the jump of dividend payout policy is due to institutional
holdings from Figure 1.6 and Table 1.9
Corporate Conditions and Policies
Figure 1.7 presents other corporate policies: capital investment, leverage, R&D, cash
saving, and number of employees with a fundamental characteristic, firm size. None
of these policies have clear visible discontinuity based on BM ratio.
Basic assumption of discontinuity design is no changes of firms’ fundamental con-
ditions. One of the basic fundamental characteristics of firm which has significant
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Figure 1.7: Corporate Condition and Policies
effect on corporate policies is firm size. As expected, firm size does not show disconti-
nuity near the cut-off threshold with two different measures, which are size percentile
and log transform.
Leverage and investment are connected in the sense of external finance. If labeling
affects investors through the channels of external finance, leverage can be affected by
index. In the same breath, external finance can affect the size of investment. This
channel can also affect R&D in the same way. If this external finance give more
financial room for firms with specific labeling, and cash saving could be changed as
dividend policy changed. However, this scenario is strongly kin to the channel of
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external finance. From Figure 1.6, Figure 1.7, and Table 1.9, it is hard to conclude
that the external finance channel is connected with labeling effect.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, by using regression discontinuity design and panel data analysis,
I show that the labeling of firms as value or growth have important implications
for firms’ dividend payout policy. By Investigating the S&P/Barra index, which
divides S&P 500 stocks into “growth” and “value” categories based on their book to
market ratios, the empirical results provide a significant jump from dividend payout
policy with the change of labeling. Indices help investors trade their assets without
scrutinizing individual stocks. On the investor’s side, “style investing” presents that
investors behave with index in the stock market. On the firm’s side, even though the
labeling does not affect corporate condition, labeling can affect firms’ dividend policy
by changing investors demand to dividend. Dividend does not only depend on firms’
corporate condition, but also investor sentiment.
I also provide that the other corporate policies/conditions such as investment,
leverage, R&D, saving, and institutional share holdings. There is no discontinuity in
other corporate conditions, besides the labeling effect itself, to explain the disconti-
nuity of dividend policy.
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Chapter 2
INVESTMENT AND DURATION OF CASH FLOW
2.1 Introduction
Investment is one of the most important activities that reflects the condition and
characteristics of firms. Firms must choose both how much to invest and how to
finance their investment as long as they are in the market. Firms also consider how
quickly they can make a return on investment because not entire profit is generated
immediately after a factory is built. As a matter of timing discrepancy between
investment and project return, the idea built on investment for the timing argument
is employed in the time-to-build model which is presented by Kydland and Prescott
(1982). The fundamental assumption of time-to-build is that time is required to build
a new project. According to the time-to-build model, omitted variables for empirical
work include lagged investment and growth rate of capital stock (Tsoukalas, 2011).
While the time-to-build model considers the timing issue in terms of investment, this
paper examine the timing issue with regards to cash flow which a firm monitors most
closely throughout the operation.
I provide a novel and intuitive explanation for investment decision by investigat-
ing firms’ heterogeneity in terms of cash flow duration. Duration of cash flow is one
of the most clear characteristics of a firm which is engaged in persistency of cash
flow. Project duration is getting shorter and shorter over time. Thus understanding
the dynamics of the duration is important and interesting to decipher the economics
activities while ignoring these dynamics might lead to misspecification issues in test-
ing the theoretical models, such as investment policy and cash flow sensitivity to
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investment model, which this paper deals with. Longer duration of cash flow gen-
erates higher cash flow from assets in place in the next period. In the light of this
consideration, it is highly probable that the duration of cash flow has an effect on
investment behavior. Firms with short cash flow duration, which expect relatively
less persistency of cash flow from assets in place, might invest less since they can
face solvency issue in the next period if they invest too much in current period. On
the other hand, asset with short-duration project will bring immediate high return
from investment; while long-duration project will make longer duration of cash flow
even though it produce low return at first. Since firm’s asset is the main source of
cash flow, cash flow duration can be read off by directly looking into the asset. The
strong correlation between cash flow and total asset supports this idea which allow
to assume that the duration of cash flow embeds in a firm’s asset.
I simply assume that firm’s cash flow duration is also given for the new project. A
firm need to decide what kind of project to undertake and how much to invest into the
project. In other words, a firm decides not only how much to invest, but also what kind
of project will be invested. A firm has a strategy for the investment allocation decision
from various projects. Cash flow duration could be determined endogenously with
investment. Here, I assume that the firm already has an investment strategy which is
reflected into project duration, and this strategy is hard to be changed within short
time window. Even though the duration could be changed with exogenous shock, it
affect not only current cash flow but also cash flow of the future, at least the adjacent
period. Therefore, it is a possible scenario that firm does not have different duration
of cash flow between new investment and asset in place in a short period.
To describe duration effect, I investigate all the channel that the duration of cash
flow might affect, which are expected future cash flow from assets in place, timing
discrepancy between investment and project return, and cost of external finance.
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First channel that duration of cash flow have an effect on is the level of cash
flow that generated from assets in place. The project return decreases at a certain
rate which is high when the duration is short. Cash flow generated from assets in
place with relatively shorter duration is not as persistent as one with longer duration.
As Goswami (2000) describes with asset maturity, a shorter duration of cash flow
generates lower cash flows in the second period. Cash flow from assets in place
plays an important role in investment policy, unless cash flow from new projects is
substantial enough to maintain business.
Second channel that duration of cash flow affects on is cash flow that generated
from new project. I assume that net present value of investment is the same, regardless
of the duration, as long as amount of investment is the same. Thus shorter duration
generate higher cash flow immediately after the investment. According to the time-to-
build model, investment does not have any influence on production before building is
completed. The longer periods of time-to-build necessitate longer periods of waiting
to taste the return from investment. A similar interpretation can be applied to the
duration of cash flow. Firms with shorter duration can achieve a return shortly after
the investment, while firms with longer duration have to wait more to reach the break
even point.
The last channel that duration of cash flow affects is cost of external finance.
External finance is the factor that attracts researchers’ attention for investment and
cash holding policy. When duration of cash flow is short, firms have a shorter payback
period for new project, and therefore they can raise external finance at lower cost. I
assume that marginal cost of external finance is increasing in the amount of external
finance, and investment is decreasing return to scale, while interest rate for saving
is constant. In this model, firms invest in a capital asset, and raise external finance
until the marginal benefit of capital equals the marginal cost of external finance. The
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firm will raise external funds until the marginal cost of external finance equals the
marginal return on saving, which I assume to be higher than the discount rate in the
model. If no financial friction occurs, reduction of external finance cost increases the
amount of saving and the amount of external finance altogether. The fact that firms
tend to simultaneously raise external finance and accumulate liquid assets is already
empirically discovered. 1 Those three channels offset each other in the aspects of
investment. Shorter duration of cash flow affects cost of external and project returns
during an adjacent period in such a way as to increase investment, while it decreases
cash flow from assets in place.
In this article, I empirically examine these reciprocal effects of cash flow duration
on investment; Decreasing next period cash flow from existing asset versus increasing
return from new investment and easiness of external finance. Using a large sample of
firms between 1976 and 2011, I find a positive correlation between cash flow duration
and investment behavior. Positive effect on investment supports that the cash flow
duration actually has more effect on expected future cash flow from assets in place.
The model also allows me to examine firms’ investment policy with market imper-
fection regarding the aspect of financial friction. Extensive literature examines the
influence of market imperfection on corporate investment by investigating empirical
data. Since the seminal study of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988), investment
response to cash flow has been interpreted as a measure of financial friction. 2 Al-
though several scholars posit that cash flow effect disappears, cash flow is still one
1Eisfeldt and Muir (2013) describe a positive correlation between cash and external financing
from aggregated level and firm level data, and analyze this fact in a model with increasing marginal
cost of external finance.
2Whether investment to cash flow sensitivity works as a measure of financial friction has been
debated by a number of papers; such as measurement error in q, Poterba(1988), non-monotonicity
hypothesis, Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), growth effect, Alti (2003), Bushman et al
(2012), inverse relationship of investment-cash flow sensitivity in financial constraints under some
measures, Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010)
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financial component which a firm directly faces, and the cash flow effect is still ar-
guable. 3 this paper shows that duration of cash flow has a positive effect on optimal
investment, then one can expect financial friction to amplify the positive effect of
the duration on investment. Quantity financial friction, known as credit rationing, is
imposed in the model to present a market imperfection. Quality constraint embeds
in the cost of external finance along with the duration of cash flow, but not as mar-
ket imperfection in my model. To explore this idea, I analyze duration of cash flow
as a determinant of investment decisions, along with the investment model followed
by Eisfeldt and Muir (2013). I use both theoretical and empirical approaches to in-
vestigate how the heterogeneity of cash flow duration influences investment policy.
Duration of cash flow shows a positive effect on optimal level of investment from an
analysis through the model.
I estimate cash flow duration sensitivity of investment for various financial friction
subsamples, grouped by the likelihood that firms have constrained access to external
finance. For the sub-sampling, I use five alternative approaches suggested by the
literature to partition the sample into unconstrained and constrained subsamples;
payout policy, age, bond ratings, KZ index measure which is derived from results
in Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and asset size. I find that investment to duration
of cash flow for constrained subgroup is significantly different from unconstrained
group which is consistent with theoretical support. However investment to cash flow
sensitivity does not have robust empirical results.
The duration measure might enrich existing literature on cash holding. Han and
Qiu (2007) show cash holding behavior due to precautionary saving motive, and only
a constrained firm has incentive to hold cash for precautionary saving in their analysis
3While Erickson and Whited (2000) show that cash flow adds no significant predictive power to
the investment equation, Gome (2001) provides a significance of cash flow effects as an important
determinant of investment.
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with cash flow volatility. While they use the cash flow volatility to investigate their
analysis, this paper can provide the source of cash flow volatility which can be found
in the firm itself with asset structure with duration of cash flow. Figure 2.1 illustrate
the overall relationship between depreciation rate of cash flow and cash flow volatility.
Figure 2.1: The stylized facts provides relationship between cash flow duration and cash flow volatility. Volatil-
ity measure use four years of quarterly 16 consecutive data of cash flow stream from the annual COMPUSTAT.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I describe the model and
discuss the solution, while in section 3, results from empirical test for assumption and
model prediction are presented. Lastly, conclusion can be found at the final section.
2.2 Model
I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to analyze the
relationship between the duration of cash flow, the financial friction, the amount of
external finance raised, capital investment, and saving. The main purpose is showing
the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment, and how the correlation
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is affected by financial friction.
2.2.1 Duration of Cash Flow
Duration of cash flow means the length of the cash flow stream generated by
investment. I simply assume cash flow diminishes by δ portion at each period. Tech-
nically, the duration of cash flow with a depreciation rate is infinite, however it is
proper measure to see how persistent their cash flow is from investment. For sim-
plicity, I assume that cash flow duration does not affect the discounted present value
of cash flow from an investment. Thus, discounted values of cash flow are equal per
unit of investment, regardless of cash flow duration. For example, if firm A has a
shorter duration of cash flow than firm B, then the cash flow depreciation rate of firm
A will be higher than that of firm B, δA > δB. Cash flow from new investment at date
one is CF1,A and CF1,B, respectively. I assume that discounted present value of cash
flow, F (I), from new investment with discount rate r is the same, no matter what
the depreciation rate is. By applying the perpetuity formula, the discounted present
value of cash flow can be shown as
CF1,A
r+δA
= F (I) =
CF1,B
r+δB
. Naturally, the higher the δ,
the higher the cash flow at date one, CF1. Thus shorter duration of cash flow brings
higher cash flow during at beginning stages of project.
Duration of cash flow affects a firm’s condition via several channels. The first is
cash flow from assets in place. Since current cash flow is also depreciated by δ portion,
when the duration is short, cash flow from assets in place decreases rapidly as time
goes on due to the high depreciation rate. δ exposes a negative effect on investment
policy through this channel, while next two channels show the opposite.
The second channel represents that shorter duration of cash flow brings higher
cash flow from a new investment at its inception than a longer one brings. I initially
assume that the discounted present value of cash flow from a new investment is the
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same regardless of the duration. Certainly, cash flow from date one is different. From
the example of discounted present value of cash flow formula above, CF1,A > CF1,B
at date one.
In the third channel, duration affects the cost of external finance. This cost de-
pends on how much external finance is issued and how expensive it is to issue external
finance. It is cheaper to issue external finance if the duration of cash flow is shorter,
because shorter duration can ensure more timely payback. If the external financing
interest rate is higher than the discount rate, re > r, then a firm’s present values
of total cash flow using external finance and internal finance are
CF1
re + δ
and
CF1
r + δ
,
respectively. Thus cost of external finance is calculated as the difference between
these two values, which is CF1
re − r
(r + δ)(re + δ)
= F (I)
re − r
re + δ
. Therefore, the cost of
external finance is decreasing in δ.
2.2.2 Optimal Policy
The main goal of this model is to show how the duration of cash flow and financial
friction affect investment and cash saving decisions. The model features a single
levered firm with external finance, investment and saving decisions with considering
duration of cash flow. In this model, a firm chooses how much to invest, I, and save,
S, 4 to maximize the present value of total cash flow.
Cash flow is generated by two sources. The first source is assets in place, which
generates a positive cash flow Xt > 0 in each period t, and the cash flow is depreciated
by δ. Thus Xt = Xt−1(1 − δ) where δ is the depreciation rate of cash flow. The
second source of cash flow is new investment, I, which generates deterministic total
4Eisfeldt and Muir(2013) discuss that cash and cash equivalent as liquid assets produce an interest
rate which is greater than the discount rate, by considering that liquid assets may provide a hedge
for investment opportunities at date one. With this setup, it is also possible to explain the positive
correlation between external finance and cash saving.
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discounted cash flow F (I), where F (I) is a standard increasing concave function with
F ′(I) > 0 and F ′′(I) < 0. Cash flow from assets in place is available from date
zero, while cash flow from investment is generated from the date one after investment
activity at date zero. If the total amount of investment and saving exceeds the initial
cash flow, then external financing can act as an alternate source.
External finance E = X0 − I − S is defined as a shortage of investment and
saving from internal funds. External financing is available only at date zero for a
new investment decision. When a firm raises external finance, it absorbs the cost of
external finance, η(δ)1
2
E2, where η(δ) is level of external financing cost. η(δ) captures
the first channel that the duration affects. Cost of external finance is decreasing in
δ, so that η(δ) is assumed to be decreasing in δ. In the case of a perfect market, a
firm can raise its external finance as much as desired by paying the external finance
costs. However, an imperfect market can restrict this system.
Market friction, which reflects market imperfection, prevents a firm from accessing
external financing in the model. This constraint can be written as following:
E = X0 − I − S ≥ −qI
A firm is only able to raise external finance up to its capacity for external finance,
qI. This capacity is determined by the level of investment and the degree of capital
market imperfection. The parameter q ∈ (0, 1) is a simple way of measuring the
degree of capital market imperfection in this environment. 5 This external finance,
along with cash flow from assets in place, can be invested into a project or saved as
a liquid asset.
The firm must make a payment for operating costs, O, at date one which is known
at data zero. If the firm can pay the operating costs at date one, then the firm can
5Myers and Rajan (1998), Almeida and Campello(2001) parameterize this q as a function of
factors such as the liquidity/tangibility of the firm’s assets and the legal environment that dictates
the relations between borrowers and creditors.
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earn all the cash flow generated afterwards. However, failure to pay the operating
costs in full at date one results in default. The firm has three sources for paying the
operating costs; cash flow from new investment, CF1, cash flow from assets in place,
X0(1−δ), and liquid assets, (rl+1)S, which come from saving at date zero where rl is
return on liquidity asset. Thus total inflow at date one is CF1 +X0(1− δ)+(rl+1)S.
Depending on the duration, this could be insufficient to pay the cost even if a new
investment is highly productive. Moreover, external financing is only available at date
zero, hence the operating costs payment must be made out of the firm’s internal funds
at date one. This gives rise to underinvestment, enabling the firm to avoid default.
The timeline of the three periods model is as follows:
At date 0, a firm chooses how much to invest, I, or save, S, with given cash flow
from assets in place, X0. If given cash flow is not enough, then external finance, E,
can be raised with cost η(δ)1
2
E2.
At date 1, the firm faces fixed operating costs, O, and total cash inflow from new
investment, assets in place and saving. The balance must be positive, in order for the
firm to survive and exploit the remaining cash flow, otherwise the firm defaults and
loses future cash flow. The discounted total cash flow until date one is E−η(δ)1
2
E2 +
1
r+1
{CF1 +X1 + S(rl + 1)−O}, and it can be rewritten as follows:
E − η(δ)1
2
E2 +
1
r + 1
{F (I)(r + δ) +X0(1− δ) + S(rl + 1)−O} 6
At date 2, the firm expects to take all the remain value of cash flow. Expected
cash flow come from two sources; CF2
r+δ
from new investment and X2
r+δ
from assets in
place. These expected total cash flow sources from date two can be rewritten as
follows:
F (I)(1− δ)
r + 1
+
X0(1− δ)2
(r + 1)(r + δ)
6Since CF1r+δ = F (I), CF1 can be replaced by F (I)(r + δ).
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The firm maximizes the discounted present value of the total cash flow, which
is the sum of the above two amounts of cash flow. For simplicity, discount rate is
normalized to zero. Figure 2.2 illustrates the model’s timeline.
0 1
2
Cash flow X0
External finance with cost Ec
Investment I
Saving S
Cash flow =
X1 (from assets in place)+
CF1 (from investment)
Operation Cost O
Ec +X1 +CF1 + S(rl + 1) ≥ O
Ec +X1 +CF1 + S(rl + 1) < O
Cash flow keep
being generated
CF2
δ
+
X2
δ
Figure 2.2: The Timeline of the Model
The firm’s objective is to maximize the total cash flow subject to various financial
constraints. This problem can be written as
Max
{I,S}
{
E − η(δ)1
2
E2 + S(rl + 1)−O + F (I) +X0 1− δ
δ
}
st. E − η(δ)1
2
E2 + F (I)δ +X0(1− δ) + S(rl + 1)−O ≥ 0
E = X0 − I − S ≥ −qI
The first budget constraint ensures firms will not default at date one with operation
cost payment. The second constraint restricts the size of external finance, which is
motivated from a credit rationing approach. 7
7Almeida and Campello(2001) develop a model with quantity constraint on the amount of external
funds that firms can raise at a given cost.
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First-Best Solution
The firm’s optimal investment depends on whether or not the borrowing conditions
and budget conditions at date one are binding. If borrowing conditions and budget
conditions are not binding, the first order condition with respect to investment, I, for
interior solution is:
1− η(δ)(X0 − I − S) = F ′(I)
The first order condition with respect to saving, S, is:
1− η(δ)(X0 − I − S) = rl + 1
Intuitively, the first order conditions equate the marginal product of capital, the
return on saving, and the marginal cost of raising external finance. Thus the amount
of investment depends on the marginal product of capital and return on saving, and
it is independent of the cost of external finance, η, and diminution of cash flow, δ.
F ′(IFB) = rl + 1
On the contrary, the amount of external finance is decreasing in η and increasing in
δ.
Second-Best Solution
Even though the financial market has no friction, first-best solution is not achieved
when the budget condition is binding. The first order condition with respect to
investment, I, is:
− 1 + η(δ)(X0 − I − S) + F ′(I) + λ{−1 + η(δ)(X0 − I − S) + δF ′(I)} = 0 (2.1)
The first order condition with respect to saving, S, is:
η(δ)(X0 − I − S) + rl + λ{η(δ)(X0 − I − S) + rl} = 0 (2.2)
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λ > 0 and −η(δ)(X0−I−S) = rl are derived from equation (2.2). Thus first-best level
of external finance is rendered achievable, while I∗ < IFB. The first part of equation
(2.1) is negative, since investment cannot achieve first-best level. The second part is
positive. If the firm is looking for optimal level of investment with binding condition,
optimal level of investment, I∗, is located under these negative/positive conditions.
These conditions are represented graphically in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: A slope of VOBJ (=FOCOBJ ) is the first part and a slope of VBC (=FOCBC) is the second part
of equation (2.1). If the firm is looking for an optimal level of investment with binding condition, optimal level of
investment, I∗, is located under FOCOBJ > 0 and FOCBC < 0 condition.
Financial Constraint - Credit Rationing
Now consider market imperfection with financial friction. When the borrowing con-
dition is binding due to financial friction, saving is determined by the respective
amounts of investment and external finance, which in turn depend on size of invest-
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ment, E = X0 − I − S = −qI. firm’s objective can be rewritten as follows:
Max
{I}
{
−qI − η(δ)1
2
(−qI)2 + {−O + (rl + 1)(X0 + qI − I)}+ F (I) +X0 1− δ
δ
}
st. − qI − η(δ)1
2
(−qI)2 + {−O + (rl + 1)(X0 + qI − I) + F (I)δ +X0(1− δ)} ≥ 0
2.2.3 Implication
Optimal Investment with Cash Flow Duration
Proposition 1 If X0 > −12η′(δ)E2 + F (I), then
The equilibrium investment I∗ is decreasing in depreciation rate of cash flow, δ
There are three major components presented by proposition 1. The external fi-
nance and the cash flow from new investment increase with higher δ, whereas the
cash flow from assets in place shrinks. That is because the reduction of the exter-
nal finance cost with the higher δ allows for the higher amount of external finance.
Furthermore, higher δ increases cash flow from new investment, while cash flow from
assets in place is dropped with δ. Thus, proposition 1 mainly illustrates that when
the depreciated cash flow from assets in place is higher than those increment from
the other sources, the equilibrium level of investment decreases in δ, and vice versa.
The binding budget condition implies the following comparative statistics:
∂I
∂X0
=
2− η(δ)E − δ
1− η(δ)E − F ′(I)δ > 0 (2.3)
∂I
∂δ
=
−1
2
η′(δ)E2 + F (I)−X0
1− η(δ)E − F ′(I)δ (2.4)
The binding budget condition with financial constraint implies the following com-
parative statistics:
∂I
∂X0
=
2− δ + rl
q + η(δ)q2I − F ′(I)δ + (rl + 1)(1− q) > 0 (2.5)
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∂I
∂δ
=
−1
2
η′(δ)(qI)2 + F (I)−X0
q + η(δ)q2I − F ′(I)δ + (rl + 1)(1− q) (2.6)
Both the equation (2.3) and (2.5) have positive signs, which means that the
amount of investment increases in initial cash flow because δ is not greater than
1. However, the signs of equations (2.4) and (2.6) vary with conditions. The numer-
ator of equation (2.4) and (2.6) shows how δ change affects the balance at date one.
The first part of the numerator is change of external financing cost with δ (positive).
The second part is change of cash flow from new investment at date one (positive),
and the third one is change of cash flow from assets in place (negative). While higher
δ can bring more external finance and higher cash flow from new investment, it can
also bring lower cash flow from assets in place. Empirical test may show which effect
dominate in real world. The empirical result shows negative sign of δ sensitivity for
investment, which indicates the existing cash flow change dominating other factors.
I will show the empirical characteristics later in section 2.3.
Exogenous variation in investment with cash flow duration
Proposition 2 When 2η(δ)qI > rl,
If
∂I
∂X0
is decreasing in q,
∂I
∂δ
is increasing in q
Optimal investment is restricted by depreciation rate of cash flow. If effective fi-
nancial friction exists in the market, then negative effect on investment from δ should
be lessen by removing financial friction and be amplified with more restriction. When
the investment to cash flow sensitivity is increasing in financial friction, the invest-
ment to duration of cash flow is decreasing in financial friction. Let the denumerator
of equation (2.5) to be D > 0; then ∂D
∂q
= 2η(δ)qI−rl. From equation (2.5), the invest-
ment to cash flow sensitivity for different level of financial friction can be measured
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by
∂2I
∂X0∂q
=
−(2− δ + rl)(2η(δ)qI − rl)
D2
(2.7)
From equation (2.6), the investment to duration of cash flow sensitivity for different
level of financial friction can be measured by
∂2I
∂δ∂q
=
−η′(δ)qI2D − (−1
2
η′(δ)(qI)2 + F (I)−X0)(2η(δ)qI − rl)
D2
(2.8)
The investment to cash flow sensitivity decreases with the capacity of external
finance, ∂
2I
∂X0∂q
< 0, only if 2η(δ)qI > rl. Thus it can be interpreted as the invest-
ment to cash flow sensitivity increase with high financial friction. The investment
to δ sensitivity increase with the capacity of external finance if 2η(δ)qI > rl. Since
the investment to δ sensitivity is negative, the high financial friction emphasize the
sensitivity. Contrary to ∂
2I
∂X0∂q
, it is possible that ∂
2I
∂δ∂q
consistently has a positive sign
with first positive part of numerator, even if 2η(δ)qI > rl condition is not satisfied.
In sum, the investment to duration of cash flow sensitivity has more tolerance.
2.3 Empirical Investigation
2.3.1 Empirical Expectation
The first empirical prediction is that the greater the firm’s depreciation rate of
cash flow, the larger the external finance. This support the characteristics of external
finance cost function η(δ) which is assumed to be decreasing in δ. Following Almeida
and Capello(2010), firms’ cash flow, size, investment opportunities, preexisting stock
of internal funding/wealth and their financial structure are controlled.
Second, the empirical test is required to verify the effect of δ on investment.
According to the proposition 1, δ has negative effect on investment in the case that
the cash flow channel dominate the other channels, and vice versa. The condition of
the proposition 1 is comparison between value of cash flow and the marginal value
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from both of external financing cost and production. However, on the basis of the
difference between total value and marginal values, one can expects negative effect
from the proposition and from empirical test as well.
Third, the greater negative effect of δ on investment is expected from financially
constrained firms. According to the proposition 2, it is possible that cash flow sen-
sitivity to investment is not affected by financial constraints, but δ sensitivity have
more tolerance to capture financial constraints.
2.3.2 Data
I construct the sample from surviving and non-surviving U.S. firms in the Com-
pustat database at any time over 1976-2011. Firms are classified into industries using
three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Similarly to Opler et al.
(1999), utility (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial institutes (SIC codes 6000-6999)
are not included in the analysis, because investment, external financing and holding
liquid asset decisions of financial firms and utilities can be restricted by other reasons
such as regulations. I eliminate firm-years for which the value of asset or sales are
not reported. As Almeida et al(2004), I eliminate firm-years for which cash holdings
exceeded the value of total assets, those for which market capitalization was less than
$10 million (in 2006 dollars), and those displaying asset or sales growth exceeding
100%. 8 I also require that firms have at least four consecutive years of data in
the sample period in order to address survivorship bias. This is also the minimum
number of years required for firms to be in this analysis given the lag structure to
develop cash flow volatility measure. To minimize the influence of outliers in the
analysis, I winsorize variables at the top and bottom 1% levels.
8Almeida et al(2004) use this screen to eliminates large jumps in business fundamentals, because
these rises typical indicate mergers, reorganizations, and other major corporate event
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Measuring Duration of Cash Flow and δ
With strong correlation between cash flow and total asset (0.8224), it is very unlikely
to disagree the claim that asset is the main source of cash flow. Goswami(2000)
describes duration of cash flows on the basis of asset maturity concept which reflects
that a long (short) maturity asset generates high (low) cash flow from assets in place
in the second period. I assume that duration of asset is followed by duration of cash
flow. When cash flow is estimated by asset with year and firm fixed effect, asset can
explain 81.11% of cash flow movement.
Duration of cash flow =
PPEGT
DP
PPEGT
AT
+
ACT
COGS
ACT
AT
Johnson(2003) defines that the maturity of fixed assets is measured as ratio of prop-
erty, plant and equipment (PPEGT) over depreciation and amortization (DP), while
the maturity of liquid assets is measured as ratio of current assets (ACT) over the
cost of goods sold (COGS). Duration of cash flow is defined as total asset maturity
which is the weighted sum of these measures where the proportion of property, plant
and equipment in total assets (PPEGT/AT) is the weight for fixed assets and the
proportion of current assets in total assets (ACT / AT) is the weight for liquid assets.
Non-linear transformation of this duration measure generates depreciation rate of
cash flow which I use in the model. Since I assume cash flow depreciates by δ rate, I
set δ to match depreciated cash flow at the duration to 10% level of initial cash flow
which means (1−δ)Duration = 0.1. With this transformation, depreciation rate of cash
flow, δ, is generated by the following formula:
δ = 1− 0.1(1/Duration of Cash Flow)
Gopalan et al(2013) use the fraction of long-term assets to test that firms with
more valuable long-term projects and less risky firms offer their executives longer-
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table contains summary statistics for sample annual data from Compustat. All data are 2006 CPI adjusted
and financial values are scaled by total asset. The table report diminution of cash flow, tangibility, Asset size,
R&D, cash, cash flow, saving, cash flow volatility, capital investment, leverage, net external finance, net debt
issue, net equity issue, long-term debt(more than three years), working years, number of observation and the
number of firms. Each column indicate overall firms, manufacturing industry, high-tech industry(three digit SIC
of 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, 737), and all but high-tech industry. Every variable is winsorized top and bottom by 1%.
Overall Manufacturing High-tech Non High-tech
τ 0.3423 0.3294 0.4044 0.2924
(0.2271) (0.194) (0.1949) (0.1825)
PPE 0.321 0.2804 0.2095 0.315
(0.2226) (0.1643) (0.1336) (0.1667)
Q 2.424 2.4678 3.1221 2.1446
(2.4282) (2.4168) (2.9585) (2.0216)
Size 2026.289 2083.313 1431.411 2401.877
(6824.303) (6923.838) (5984.385) (7318.27)
R&D 0.0327 0.045 0.1026 0.0176
(0.0694) (0.0769) (0.1051) (0.0337)
Cash 0.1415 0.1437 0.242 0.0968
(0.1798) (0.1831) (0.2418) (0.1216)
Saving 0.0039 0.0045 0.0066 0.0035
(0.1057) (0.1074) (0.1512) (0.0782)
Cash Flow 0.0735 0.0712 0.0417 0.0853
(0.1376) (0.1398) (0.1947) (0.1008)
Volatility 0.0185 0.0186 0.0266 0.0141
(0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0437) (0.0385)
CAPX 0.0774 0.0643 0.0639 0.0645
(0.084) (0.0616) (0.0675) (0.0586)
Leverage 0.4191 0.4045 0.293 0.4591
(0.3072) (0.293) (0.2925) (0.2773)
Net External 0.0323 0.0279 0.0497 0.0179
(0.1415) (0.1377) (0.1804) (0.1115)
Net Debt Issue 0.0171 0.0136 0.0141 0.0134
(0.0994) (0.0919) (0.0989) (0.0883)
Net Equity Issue 0.0155 0.0146 0.0355 0.0051
(0.1013) (0.1036) (0.1503) (0.0712)
Debt 3yr 0.5072 0.5129 0.4084 0.5618
(1.6182) (0.5167) (0.6808) (0.4092)
Age 12.8434 14.3657 11.8345 15.6002
(11.2164) (11.9323) (10.0113) (12.5814)
No. of Obs. 146146 78950 25916 53034
Unique 13564 6519 2512 4007
duration pay contracts. They define the long-term asset as the ratio of book value of
property plant and equity plus goodwill over non-cash total assets. The correlation
of between long-term measure and the duration of cash flow is 0.6659. The robust
tests are performed with this long-term asset measure, and, as expected, The tests
show consistent result with the duration of cash flow.
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Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 contains summary statistics for sample annual data from Compustat. All
data are 2006 CPI adjusted and financial values are scaled by total asset. The table
report depreciation rate of cash flow, cash flow, and other financial values. Each
column indicate overall firms, manufacturing industry, high-tech industry (three digit
SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384), and manufacturing but high-tech industry.
Of greater interest, the average value of δ is the highest in high-tech industry which
has fast technology cycle in the market, δ in high-tech industry is 0.4044 which is
higher than 0.2924 in non high-tech industry, so that duration of cash flow in high-
tech industry is much shorter than one in other industry. Net external finance in
high-tech industry is roughly 2.8 times higher than non high tech industry (0.0497
and 0.0179, respectively.) This is consistent with model prediction because shorter
duration of cash flow would decrease cost of external finance.
2.3.3 External Finance with Duration of Cash Flow
Prior to test the model, this section supports the channel of external finance which
is assumed to have positive relationship with the duration of cash flow from the model.
Since δ leads the higher amount of external finance via cost of external finance, the
empirical model for external financing specifies δ. The empirical model for external
finance also consists of firm size, cash flow and investment opportunities based on
Almeida and Campello(2010). The model is as follows:
Issuance of Ext. Financei,t =β0 + β1δi,t + β2Investmenti,t + β3Cash Flowi,t
+β4Qi,t−1 + β5Sizei,t + i,t
(2.9)
I focus on the effect of δ on the issuance of external financing which is captured
by β1. According to the model, cost of external finance,
1
2
η(δ)(qI)2 depends on δ,
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investment and level of financial friction. To control economies of scale for external
finance and financial friction, natural log of book value is included in the baseline
specification as Size. Q captures information about the investment opportunities
which denote market to book value. While Almeida and Campello(2010) use net
external finance for the empirical test to provide evidence on the relation between
internal fund and external financing for constrained and unconstrained firms, I inves-
tigate empirical model with issuance of external finance to verify δ effects on cost of
external finance. It is possible to address an idea that this investigation can be biased
due to repurchasing of external finance. However, even if net external finance substi-
tutes the issuance of external finance in the test, the results are consistent. Almeida
and Campello(2010) extend their regression model with cash reserve, inventory and
tangibility to control other investment and liquidity demand. I borrow this extension
for the second regression model. On the top of this model, I consider firm structure
by controlling leverage and the age of the firms.
Table 2.2 presents the result of the estimation from three external finance re-
gression models based on equation (2.9). Left panel of the Table 2.2 shows the test
result when the dependent variable is issuance of external finance and the right hand
side panel shows the identical test with net external finance as a dependent variable.
These two results are consistent. Depreciation rate of cash flow, δ, has positive effect
on both issuance of external finance and net external finance sections for all models
(0.0505 to 0.0766) which means that firm with shorter duration access more external
finance. Positive effect of δ on net external financing support that cost of external
finance η(δ) is decreasing function of δ.
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Table 2.2: External Finance with Duration of Cash Flow
This table contains linear regression result for issuance of external finance and net external finance which consists
of equity issue and debt issue. δ has positive effect on issuance of external finance and net external finance for all
section. Since external finance can be affected by several firm characteristics, I control firm’s other specifics such as
tangibility, leverage, working years, cash reserve, and firm size. All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT. The
sample period is 1976 through 2011. Net external financing increase in δ which support that cost of external finance
η(δ) is decreasing function of δ. The estimations include year fixed effect and firm fixed effect. The associated
standard errors are reported as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Issuance of External Financing Net External Financing
Ext Ext Ext NetExt NetExt NetExt
δ 0.0505*** 0.0766*** 0.0746*** 0.0542*** 0.0718*** 0.0711***
(0.0111) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0060)
CAPX 0.8323*** 0.8235*** 0.8007*** 0.7993*** 0.7929*** 0.7850***
(0.0150) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0110)
Cash Flow -0.2253*** -0.1445*** -0.0691*** -0.2352*** -0.1813*** -0.1554***
(0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0154) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0121)
Q 0.0063*** 0.0067*** 0.0079*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 0.0061***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Size 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0103*** 0.0140*** 0.0163*** 0.0155***
(0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Cash Reserve -0.1699*** -0.1344*** -0.0672*** -0.0555***
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0061) (0.0063)
Inventory 0.0754*** 0.0794*** 0.0977*** 0.0990***
(0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0086) (0.0087)
PPE 0.0782*** 0.0601*** 0.0516*** 0.0455***
(0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0076) (0.0077)
Leverage 0.1399*** 0.0466***
(0.0080) (0.0038)
Age 0.0034*** 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0001)
Const -0.0674*** -0.1120*** -0.1738*** -0.1109*** -0.1834*** -0.1989***
(0.0126) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0064) (0.0084) (0.0083)
No. of Obs. 117657 100992 100791 110075 94757 94598
R-Squared 0.081 0.082 0.096 0.185 0.183 0.188
2.3.4 Optimal Investment with Duration of Cash Flow
I begin my analysis by investigating whether δ can capture the cross-sectional
difference in investment decision. Firm’s investment decision from duration of cash
flow depends on how much the duration affects cost of external finance, cash flow from
new investment at date one, and cash flow from assets in place. Proposition 1 explains
the relationship between the duration and investment decision within endogeneity-
free setup. Table 2.3 contains regression result of the baseline model with fixed effects
which invigorate the argument. The baseline empirical model (2.10) is followed by
investment, external finance and cash saving model which I propose below.
Investmenti,t = β0+β1δi,t+β2Qi,t−1+β3cash flowi,t+β4Net Ext. financei,t+i,t (2.10)
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The regression model is extended to manage potential concerns about model spec-
ification. I control firm’s other specifics such as tangibility, leverage, and firm size. δ
is a measure of depreciation rate of cash flow which reflect duration of asset. However
duration of asset may affected by tangibility of asset. Thus δ may indirectly capture
effect of tangibility to external finance. Leverage has the same concern to external
finance. Size is one of the main characteristics of firm which possibly affects all the
existing components from economy of scale. By controlling these factors, I can expect
to capture more accurate effect from existing variables.
Investmenti,t =β0 + β1δi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash Flowi,t + β4Net Ext. Financei,t
+ β5Sizei,t + β6Leveragei,t + β7Tangibilityi,t−1 + i,t
(2.11)
Regressions contain time fixed effect, time and industry fixed effects, and time
and firm fixed effects respectively in each column. These fixed effects can take care
of the potential technological shocks, which imbed into time, industry, or firm itself.
Result of regression model (2.10) and model (2.11) is reported in Table 2.3. The
coefficient of δ in Table 2.3 consistently shows negative sign(-0.1115 to -0.0076) with
1% of significant level , so one can conclude that duration of cash flow have an
effect more on existing cash flow change than on the other factors. This empirical
evidence support the condition of proposition 1. By controlling other effects which
may correlated with existing variables, it shows clear result as baseline model reports
with stronger coefficient values. With year and firm fixed effects, coefficients of δ
has higher values (-0.0911 to -0.0750), while other coefficients have similar coefficient
value.
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Table 2.3: Investment Decision
This table displays results for OLS estimations of following baseline and extended regression:
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1δi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash flowi,t + β4Net Ext. financei,t + i,t
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1δi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash Flowi,t + β4Net Ext. Financei,t + β5Sizei,t + β6Leveragei,t +
β7Tangibilityi,t−1 + i,t
All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT. The sample period is 1976 through 2011. The estimations include year
fixed effect and firm fixed effect. The associated standard errors are reported as heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Baseline Extended
(Fixed Effect) Year Year/Industry Year/Firm Year Year/Industry Year/Firm
δ -0.1114*** -0.0829*** -0.0750*** -0.0085*** -0.0277*** -0.0911***
(0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0048) (0.0033)
Q 0.0036*** 0.0038*** 0.0043*** 0.0045*** 0.0043*** 0.0043***
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Cash Flow 0.1856*** 0.1695*** 0.1333*** 0.1675*** 0.1637*** 0.1365***
(0.0044) (0.0183) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0204) (0.0042)
Net Ext. Finance 0.2357*** 0.2213*** 0.1881*** 0.2119*** 0.2105*** 0.1871***
(0.0046) (0.0286) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0284) (0.0040)
Size -0.0025*** -0.0017*** 0.0037***
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Leverage 0.0017 0.0036 0.0075***
(0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0018)
PPE 0.1531*** 0.1075*** -0.0455***
(0.0034) (0.0107) (0.0054)
Const 0.0762*** 0.0448*** 0.0764*** 0.0116*** 0.0005 0.0747***
(0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0072) (0.0021) (0.0059) (0.0082)
No. of Obs. 101879 101879 101879 101706 101706 101706
R-Squared 0.325 0.418 0.261 0.407 0.444 0.265
Robust Test with Alternative Measure
The measure of the cash flow duration is derived from asset maturity. Thus the du-
ration of cash flow can be alternatively measured by looking characteristics of asset
itself. For example, long-term asset which is defined by Gopalan et al (2013) can
explain the duration of asset, so I substitutes δ to long term asset for robustness
test. Since δ and long-term asset has opposite direction in the sense of investigating
asset maturity, expected sign from robust test is also opposite. Positive values for
the coefficient of long-term asset are expected, while δ has negative effect on invest-
ment. Regression model for this test is the same as regression model (2.11), but δ is
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Table 2.4: Investment Regressions - Robust Test with Alternative Measure
This table displays results of δ and cash flow from linear regressions of following model:
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1δi,t(or Long term asseti,t) + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash flowi,t + β4Net Ext. financei,t + i,t
Investmenti,t = β0 +β1δi,t(or Long term asseti,t)+β2Qi,t−1 +β3Cash Flowi,t+β4Net Ext. Financei,t+β5Sizei,t+
β6Leveragei,t + β7Tangibilityi,t−1 + i,t
All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT. The sample period is 1988 through 2011. The estimations include year
fixed effect and firm fixed effect. The associated standard errors are reported as heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Panel A. δ Basic Extended
(Fixed Effect) Year Year/Industry Year/Firm Year Year/Industry Year/Firm
δ -0.1023*** -0.0723*** -0.0557*** -0.0046*** -0.0207*** -0.0700***
(0.0020) (0.0048) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0053) (0.0033)
Q 0.0034*** 0.0046*** 0.0062*** 0.0053*** 0.0054*** 0.0060***
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Cash Flow 0.1572*** 0.1381*** 0.0937*** 0.1305*** 0.1259*** 0.0905***
(0.0047) (0.0172) (0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0184) (0.0040)
Net Ext. Finance 0.1975*** 0.1813*** 0.1445*** 0.1713*** 0.1704*** 0.1462***
(0.0054) (0.0296) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0289) (0.0044)
Size -0.0019*** -0.0012** 0.0033***
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Leverage -0.0110*** -0.0074** -0.0063***
(0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0020)
PPE 0.1552*** 0.1106*** -0.0465***
(0.0022) (0.0128) (0.0067)
Const 0.0764*** 0.0421*** 0.0516*** 0.0114*** -0.0044 0.0505***
(0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0066) (0.0053)
No. of Obs. 62914 62914 62914 62777 62777 62777
R-Squared 0.298 0.405 0.224 0.392 0.435 0.228
Panel B. Longterm Basic Extended
(Fixed Effect) Year Year/Industry Year/Firm Year Year/Industry Year/Firm
Longterm 0.1433*** 0.1173*** 0.0989*** 0.0737*** 0.0711*** 0.1362***
(0.0029) (0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0102) (0.0056)
Q 0.0045*** 0.0045*** 0.0068*** 0.0047*** 0.0050*** 0.0064***
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Cash Flow 0.1565*** 0.1438*** 0.0992*** 0.1453*** 0.1391*** 0.1015***
(0.0048) (0.0171) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0194) (0.0044)
Net Ext. Finance 0.1914*** 0.1800*** 0.1470*** 0.1779*** 0.1759*** 0.1516***
(0.0054) (0.0300) (0.0048) (0.0041) (0.0300) (0.0048)
Size -0.0025*** -0.0020*** -0.0048***
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Leverage -0.0071*** -0.0039 -0.0041*
(0.0010) (0.0034) (0.0022)
PPE 0.0981*** 0.0767*** -0.0879***
(0.0025) (0.0189) (0.0075)
Const -0.0187*** -0.0432*** -0.0136*** -0.0071*** -0.0337*** 0.0258***
(0.0013) (0.0053) (0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0054) (0.0060)
No. of Obs. 56795 56795 56795 56605 56605 56605
R-Squared 0.357 0.434 0.231 0.411 0.449 0.243
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substituted to long-term asset. The Regression model is as follows:
Investmenti,t =β0 + β1Long-termi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash Flowi,t + β4Net Ext. Financei,t
+ β5Sizei,t + β6Leveragei,t + β7Tangibilityi,t−1 + i,t
(2.12)
Since variable goodwill which is a component to generate long term asset measure
is available from 1988, Table 2.4 contains results with observation after 1988. As
expected, the coefficients of long-term asset consistently shows positive values in
Table 2.4. One interesting finding is that cash flow after 1988 does not explain
investment as much as before which support disappearance of investment to cash
flow sensitivity literatures. 9
2.3.5 Market Imperfection with Duration of Cash Flow
Financial Constraint Criteria
• Scheme #1: Payout ratio
I rank firms based on their payout ratio in each fiscal year in the data and assign
to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms in the bottom
(top) three deciles of the annual payout distribution. I compute the payout
ratio by scaling dividends plus stock buybacks minus stock issues. As argued
by Fazzari et al. (1988), firms with zero dividend payouts are more likely to
face binding constraints than firms paying high dividends. 10
• Scheme #2: Firm size
9chen et al (2012) address the disappearance of investment-cash flow effect as time goes, the
disappearance exists even in financial crisis which is considered as high financial friction period.
Tsoukalas(2011) shows that cash flow effect largely disappears by controlling for time to build
10Moyen (2004) shows that low dividend ratios may come up with high cash flow sensitivities
even if they are unconstrained by suggesting omitted variable issue with respect to debt financing.
Because unconstrained firms can attain more leverage, amount of dividends as a fraction of their
assets would be smaller than that of constrained firms
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Firm size has been used as a proxy for access to external finance in a number
of studies (Kim et al., 1998). I split firms into large and small size groups
based on average asset size during the sample period. I assign to the financially
constrained (unconstrained) group those firms in the bottom (top) three deciles
of the annual asset size distribution.
• Scheme #3: Age of firm
I assign firms as mature if it has more than 15 working years after the year it
first appear in Compustat with a stock price. Firm age has been used as a proxy
for the presence of financing frictions in a number of recent studies( Brown and
Peterson, 2011). Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue that the age and size of the
firm are relatively exogenous firm characteristics to identify constrained firms.
• Scheme #4: Bond rating
I split firms based on whether or not a bond rating is reported in Compustat.
Financially unconstrained firms are those whose bonds have been rated during
the sample period.
• Scheme #5: KZ index
I construct an index of firm financial constraints following Lamont, Polk and
Saa-requejo (2001) which is based on results in Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
Firms are separated by following KZ index.
KZ index =− 1.0019(Cash Flow) + 0.2826(Q) + 3.1392(Leverage)
− 39.3678(Dividends)− 1.3148(Cash Holdings)
Firms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the KZ index ranking are considered
financially unconstrained (constrained).
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Baseline Investment Regressions by Financial Constraint Criteria
I experiment a model with an interaction term that allows the effect of δ to vary with
market friction. The empirical model is as following:
Investmenti,t =β0 + β1δi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash flowi,t + β4Net Ext. financei,t
+β5 q+β6(δi,t ×q) + i,t
(2.13)
where q = 1 if a firm is financially constrained, 0 if unconstrained. Model (2.13)
is a linear measure of the influence of financial friction on investment δ sensitivity,
and its interaction term makes the interpretation of the estimated coefficients more
comprehensible. Since (β1 + β6q) capture the effect of δ on investment, one have to
read off (β1 + β6) to assess the effect of δ for the financially constrained firms, and
β1 only for unconstrained firms. This interaction form has applied to the extended
model (2.11) as following:
Investmenti,t =β0 + β1δi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash Flowi,t + β4Net Ext. Financei,t
+β5Sizei,t + β6Leveragei,t + β7Tangibilityi,t−1
+β8 q+β9(δi,t ×q) + i,t
(2.14)
Results of regression model (2.13) and model (2.14) is reported in Table 2.5 by
financial constraints criteria. Each panel A and panel B reports regression results of
model (2.13) and model (2.14) respectively. Panel A which shows baseline regression
presents negative coefficient value for δ with 1% significant level (-0.0605 to -0.0442).
This result is amplified from the test with extended model in panel B (-0.0925 to
-0.0660) and both panel shows that all financial friction but the size magnify the
negative effect of δ on investment (-0.0084 to -0.0381). These significant effect between
unconstraint and constraint firms is consistent with proposition 2.
67
Table 2.5: Investment Regressions by Financial Constraint Criteria-Baseline Re-
gression
This table displays results of δ and cash flow from linear regressions of following models:
Panel A : Investmenti,t = β0 + β1δi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash flowi,t + β4Net Ext. financei,t + β5 q+β6(δi,t ×q) + i,t
Panel B : Investmenti,t = β0+β1δi,t+β2Qi,t−1+β3Cash Flowi,t+β4Net Ext. Financei,t+β5Sizei,t+β6Leveragei,t+
β7Tangibilityi,t−1 + β8 q+β9(δi,t ×q) + i,t
All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT. The sample period is 1976 through 2011. The estimations include year
fixed effect and firm fixed effect. The associated standard errors are reported as heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Panel A. δ Effect with Baseline Regression
Payout Size Age Bond rate KZ index
δ -0.0605*** -0.0516*** -0.0502*** -0.0543*** -0.0442***
(0.0043) (0.0125) (0.0042) (0.0062) (0.0053)
Cash Flow 0.1185*** 0.1251*** 0.1297*** 0.1295*** 0.1307***
(0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0049)
Q 0.0032*** 0.0035*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0023***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Net Ext. finance 0.1690*** 0.1742*** 0.1815*** 0.1815*** 0.1911***
(0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0052)
Constraint 0.0023 -0.0030 0.0099*** 0.0389***
(0.0022) (0.0073) (0.0019) (0.0029)
Constraint -0.0084* -0.0185 -0.0316*** -0.0381*** -0.0251***
× δ (0.0044) (0.0132) (0.0049) (0.0076) (0.0053)
Const 0.0533*** 0.0652*** 0.0621*** 0.0696*** 0.0455***
(0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0033)
No. of Obs. 73748 61460 109869 109869 60792
R-Squared 0.236 0.243 0.252 0.252 0.257
Panel B. δ Effect with Extended Regression
Payout Size Age Bond rate KZ index
δ -0.0847*** -0.0925*** -0.0723*** -0.0800*** -0.0660***
(0.0045) (0.0061) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0041)
Cash Flow 0.1270*** 0.1335*** 0.1394*** 0.1391*** 0.1349***
(0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0053)
Q 0.0033*** 0.0037*** 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0019***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Net Ext. finance 0.1751*** 0.1849*** 0.1885*** 0.1885*** 0.2018***
(0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0055)
Size 0.0039*** 0.0047*** 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 0.0040***
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Leverage 0.0085*** 0.0079*** 0.0065*** 0.0068*** -0.0171***
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0024)
PPE -0.0616*** -0.0593*** -0.0452*** -0.0462*** -0.0782***
(0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0078)
Constraint 0.0025 0.0021 0.0110*** 0.0522***
(0.0021) (0.0066) (0.0015) (0.0032)
Constraint -0.0087** 0.0077 -0.0332*** -0.0266*** -0.0324***
× δ (0.0039) (0.0079) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0054)
Const 0.0902*** 0.0786*** 0.0773*** 0.0840*** 0.0823***
(0.0111) (0.0137) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0103)
No. of Obs. 67804.000 56639.000 101706.000 101706.000 55703.000
R-Squared 0.249 0.259 0.265 0.263 0.275
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Robust Test for the Model with Financial Friction
I now investigate robustness check with long-term asset measure from Gopalan et al
(2013) for the model in financial friction criteria. Baseline model (2.13) and extended
regression model (2.14) which controls additional size, leverage and tangibility effect
are tested within two financial friction group. Gopalan et al (2013) use goodwill
to generate the long-term measure, which is available from 1988. Thus, the sample
period of this test is limited after 1988. In Table 2.6, I report in two panels for each
regression model. Table 2.6 also displays significant effect of long-term assets which is
consistent with Table 2.5 result. Constraint dummy × Long-term asset presents the
effect of financial friction to the sensitivity of investment to long-term asset. Overall,
the sensitivities are significantly positive and follow model prediction in all financial
friction criteria while it shows not significant coefficient with size criteria.
Subsample Regressions by Financial Constraint Criteria
Investment to cash flow sensitivity is interpreted as financial fiction, since Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) find out a positive sensitivity of investment to cash flow.
As it is shown in previous Tables, cash flow increase investment activity. Sensitivity
of investment to cash flow and sensitivity of investment to duration of cash flow can
be described from the regression results of equation (2.10). Table 2.7 summaries
the regression result of model (2.10) and model (2.11) in each financial constraint
subsample in panel A and panel B, respectively. A total of 20 estimated equations
is reported in the table (two panels × five constraints criteria × two constraints
categories). Table 2.7 displays significant difference of the investment to duration
of cash flow sensitivity between unconstraint and constraint firm. The sensitivity is
more stable than the sensitivity of investment to cash flow which is expected from
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Table 2.6: Investment Regressions by Financial Constraint Criteria-Alternative mea-
sure
This table displays results of δ and cash flow from linear regressions of following models:
Panel A : Investmenti,t = β0 +β1Longtermi,t +β2Qi,t−1 +β3Cash flowi,t +β4Net Ext. Financei,t +β5 q+β6(δi,t×
q) + i,t
Panel B : Investmenti,t = β0 + β1Longtermi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Cash Flowi,t + β4Net Ext. Financei,t + β5Sizei,t +
β6Leveragei,t + β7Tangibilityi,t−1 + β8 q+β9(δi,t ×q) + i,t
All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT. The sample period is 1988 through 2011. The estimations include year
fixed effect and firm fixed effect. The associated standard errors are reported as heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Panel A. Longterm Asset Effect with Baseline Regression
Payout Size Age Bond rate KZ index
Longterm 0.0902*** 0.0835*** 0.0816*** 0.0893*** 0.0585***
(0.0056) (0.0081) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0057)
Cash Flow 0.0944*** 0.0975*** 0.1006*** 0.1002*** 0.0954***
(0.0044) (0.0053) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0053)
Q 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0028***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Net Ext. Finance 0.1312*** 0.1327*** 0.1412*** 0.1412*** 0.1467***
(0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0060)
Constraint -0.0073*** -0.0105 -0.0121*** 0.0104***
(0.0020) (0.0119) (0.0022) (0.0031)
Constraint 0.0165*** 0.0188 0.0255*** 0.0251*** 0.0387***
× Longterm (0.0056) (0.0121) (0.0054) (0.0092) (0.0089)
Const -0.0048 -0.0010 0.0322*** 0.0239*** -0.0067**
(0.0032) (0.0065) (0.0032) (0.003) (0.0033)
No. of Obs. 42618 34646 61373 61373 33562
R-Squared 0.213 0.206 0.219 0.219 0.219
Panel B. Longterm Asset Effect with Extended Regression
Payout Size Age Bond rate KZ index
Longterm 0.1354*** 0.1489*** 0.1237*** 0.1269*** 0.0886***
(0.0071) (0.0095) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0076)
Cash Flow 0.1018*** 0.1031*** 0.1062*** 0.1057*** 0.0983***
(0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0057)
Q 0.0042*** 0.0047*** 0.0045*** 0.0045*** 0.0028***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Net Ext. Finance 0.1441*** 0.1494*** 0.1538*** 0.1539*** 0.1655***
(0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0067)
Size -0.0061*** -0.0049*** -0.0047*** -0.0048*** -0.0041***
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Leverage -0.0030 -0.0062** -0.0045** -0.0048** -0.0219***
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0029)
PPE -0.1060*** -0.1123*** -0.0888*** -0.0900*** -0.1202***
(0.0092) (0.0102) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0110)
Constraint -0.0081*** -0.0180 -0.0112*** 0.0148***
(0.0021) (0.0141) (0.0024) (0.0034)
Constraint 0.0160*** -0.0053 0.0217*** 0.0331*** 0.0620***
× Longterm (0.0059) (0.0132) (0.0058) (0.0106) (0.0104)
Const 0.0408*** 0.0791*** 0.0346*** 0.0278*** 0.0370***
(0.0072) (0.0122) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0081)
No. of Obs. 39006 31822 56605 56605 30587
R-Squared 0.238 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.250
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proposition 2. Among five criteria, only two criteria, bond rate and KZ index, displays
investment to cash flow sensitivity increment with friction, while duration of cash flow
sensitivity has emphsized with friction consistently in four criteria except payout ratio.
For example, coefficient of τ is negative and it is emphasized with more financial
friction firm size criteria with baseline model, from -0.0479 to -0.0685. However,
coefficient of cash flow is smaller with financial friction from 0.2062 to 0.0903, which
suppose to be increased if it truly reflects financial friction.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide the implication of cash flow duration and investment inter-
action for understanding stylized facts of empirical capital structure, which finding is
that shorter cash flow duration lessen investment activity. From the model depicting
that firm optimally invest in production with firm specific cash flow duration, I ana-
lyze that even in the absence of financing constraints, it is possible to observe positive
investment-cash flow sensitivities. More importantly, firms with a shorter cash flow
duration tend to retrench investment unless new investment has substantially large
return. This result is driven by the firms’ tendencies of operating cost to cash flow
from asset in place rather than external finance or return from new investment.
By analyzing the model with additional financing constraint, I show that the
cash flow duration and investment relationship is amplified with the level of financial
constraint. This also provides an explanation on why the young firms invest more
than the old ones do. Young firmd usually faces financial constraints. When young
firms encounter increment of duration of cash flow with their growth, more investment
will be made, and financial constraints amplify this investment. In addition, I confirm
that it is possible the cash flow sensitivity to investment does not clearly show the
constraint. Therefore, this paper can provide analysis of investment policy model
72
through cash flow duration effect with financial constraint.
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APPENDIX A
INTERNAL VALIDITY TEST FOR CHAPTER 1
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Figure A.1: Internal Validity - Density Test
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITION OF MAIN VARIABLES FOR CHAPTER 2
81
Table B.1: Definition of Main Variables
Chapter 1
Dividend Payout Dividend per Share / Earning per Share (excluding extraordinary items),
%
Dividend Yield Dividend per Share / Price Close, %
Repurchases Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock / Total Assets, %
Net Repurchases Treasury Stock / Total Assets, %
If Treasury stock is not used for 2 years, then
Max {0, (Purchase - Sale of Common and Preferred Stock)
/ Total assets}, %
Growth Rate (Total Assets - Total Assetst−1) / Total Assetst−1, %
ROA Income Before Extraordinary Items / Total Assets, %
Investment Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, %
R&D Research and Development Expense / Total Assets, %
Leverage Long-Term Debt / Total Debt, %
Saving (Cash and Short-Term Investments
- Cash and Short-Term Investmentst−1)/ Total Assetst−1, %
Institutional Sum of Institutional Shares Holdings from 13F filing
Holdings / Shares Outstanding, %
Employment growth (Employees - Employeest−1) / Employeest−1 , %
Chater 2
Cash Assets Cash and Short-term Investments / Total Assetst−1
Investment Capital Expenditures / Total Assetst−1
Cash Flow Earnings before Extraordinary Items and Depreciation / Total Assetst−1
Q A proxy for investment opportunities computed as
(AT + (CSHO × PRCC f) - CEQ- TXDITC) / AT
Net Debt Issue (Long-Term Debt Issuance - Long-Term Debt Reduction) / Total
Assetst−1
Net Equity Issue (Sale of Common and Preferred Stock - Purchase of Common and Pre-
ferred Stock) / Total Assetst−1
Net External Finance Net Debt Issue + Net Equity Issue
Long-term Assets (Book Value of Property Plant and Equity + Goodwill) / Non-cash Total
Assets
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